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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
by
Harun Onder
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Richard Chisik, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in
international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade
liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments
provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to
reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information
asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure
enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of
cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading
partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in
turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in
cooperation.
The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two
policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues
are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs
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(Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical
level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve
the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric
issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are
interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking
the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited
punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes.
The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking
trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements
generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I
focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects
of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some
interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded
goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade
agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will
reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when
the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.
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I. STARTING SMALL IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
I.I. INTRODUCTION
Trade liberalization does not occur overnight. A series of bilateral and multilateral
agreements have gradually reduced the average tariff rate from 18% in Europe and 15%
in North America in the late 1950s to 4% in the North Atlantic nations by the end of 20th
century (Baldwin, 2006). Gradualism in free trade agreements, however, is not limited to
tariff reductions. A noteworthy aspect of the transition from protectionist trade policies to
freer trade is the gradually increasing scope of liberalization. Trading partners might
prefer starting with a few-goods-agreement, and gradually transform it to a more
comprehensive one under favorable circumstances.
Historically, one can observe that sector-based gradualism has been manifested in
multilateral, bilateral, and regional forms. New tariff concessions under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) terms were negotiated on a product-by-product
basis in Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956) and Dillon
(1960-61) rounds. Almost two decades after the initial negotiations for the GATT
negotiators expanded the method to an industry/sector-wide schedule for the first time in
the Kennedy Round of 1962-67. The European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the
US-Canada Auto Pact (1965) are other well known cases which prepared the ground for
further cooperation between signatory governments. Yet, not all sector-specific
agreements are designed to evolve into broad cooperation schemes. More recently, the
US government negotiated sector-specific agreements on “zero-for-zero” basis.
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) was developed in 1996 and followed by
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Financial Services Agreement (FSA) in 1997. Following the success of the former
agreement, APEC ministers negotiated nine additional sectors in Vancouver in 1997,
which failed because of the objections of Japan and other Asian countries. The most
important difference between the agreements with a gradually increasing scope and the
recent zero-for-zero sector-based agreements arises in dispute settlement procedure. The
former type of agreement denotes a body of linked issues with relatively flexible crossretaliation prospects; whereas the latter one defines a series of unlinked issues with very
limited cross-retaliation possibilities.

This paper examines gradualism in free trade

agreements in the framework of linked agreements. More specifically, I investigate the
mechanism behind the gradual increments in the number of issues linked to the original
body. Why do countries prefer starting an agreement with a few sectors rather than
settling with the optimal scope at the outset of an agreement? Under which conditions
does the initial agreement with limited scope provide further cooperation later on?
This paper proposes an answer for these questions within a stylized perspective.
Unilaterally optimal trade policies harm trading partners through terms-of-trade
externalities. Reciprocal concessions in otherwise selfishly commanded trade, therefore,
provide gains for both countries in a long term relationship. I show, however, that the
presence of asymmetric information regarding the partner’s incentive to betray in the
future impedes full cooperation in early stages of the relationship. Governments prefer
“starting small” in an uncertain environment in order to reduce the cost of partner’s
betrayal. Learning about trading partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations and
encourages governments to increase their current level of cooperation. More specifically,
the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being “good” is
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improved as the partner cooperates under a self-enforcing agreement. This updated belief,
in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in
cooperation. Learning, therefore, is the mechanism that provides gradualism in my
model.
To assess the evolution of cooperation I develop a simple model in which two
large countries produce and trade a continuum of goods. Although I assume that countries
are symmetric in both demand and supply conditions, there are two important
asymmetries: the presence of one-sided incomplete information and the privilege of
uninformed government to propose a contract. Foreign government privately observes its
dynamically stochastic political economy concerns. It may experience political economy
shocks in the form of protectionist bias for its import competing sectors. Home
government proposes a contract using its subjective belief, in response, since it cannot
observe the actual probability of a shock. Therefore, the model suggests a case where a
“weak” (foreign) country requests access to a free trade agreement and the “strong”
country (home or a customs union) proposes the terms of the agreement, specifically the
scope of the agreement. Some typical examples for these “new regionalist” agreements
(Ethier, 1998) are Mexico’s accession to North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), European Union’s enlargement in Eastern Europe, and free trade agreements
between US and others 1 which prevail or are proposed.
My analysis builds on a recursive structure that emerges from an infinitely
repeated interaction. I define the type of the foreign government on the basis of its
likelihood of experiencing a political economy shock. By choice of parameters, if the
1

These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, Singapore, Panama,
Peru and Oman.
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probability of that shock is high enough (type-2), then the foreign government betrays by
choosing unilaterally optimal tariffs whenever that shock is realized. On the other hand, it
cooperates even when the shock occurs if the probability is low enough (type-1). In the
absence of informational asymmetry, where the type of foreign government is common
knowledge, governments cooperate at a maximum level starting with the first period if
they are patient enough given the probability of a shock. Cooperation when the type of
foreign government is not observed by the home government is, however, more
cumbersome. Home government’s prior belief about the foreign government’s type is
updated in a Bayesian fashion upon observing foreign government’s action in each
period. Therefore, an agreement should take any additional information revealed in the
course of a relationship into consideration. One way to do this is to assume that the longterm relationship is run by a sequence of short-term contracts. Alternatively, the initial
agreement can be designed so as to avoid reneging without loss of generality (see Laffont
and Tirole, 1990). I follow the second option.
I specify two classes of equilibrium in asymmetric information environment. In a
pooling equilibrium, both types of foreign government cooperate perpetually as long as
no shock is observed. Only a type-2 foreign government betrays whenever a shock is
realized. I show that the home government proposes increasing the cooperation gradually,
conditional on the cooperative action of foreign government in equilibrium. Eventually
the cooperation level reaches the maximum and stays stationary afterwards unless
betrayal is observed. In a separating equilibrium, on the other hand, probability of
political economy shock for a type-2 foreign government is high enough that it betrays,
even before a shock is realized, when the cooperation is stationary. Home government
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needs to provide sufficient intertemporal incentives to keep type-2 foreign government in
a cooperative relationship. This comprises my version of the well known “Bicycle
Theory,” which was discussed by Bhagwati (1988). A failure to provide further
liberalization ends up bringing cooperation to an end. However, “pedaling” cannot be
sustained forever in my model since the level of cooperation is bounded above by the
number of goods. Therefore, cooperation with a “bad” partner is dissolved eventually
once the countries deplete their liberalization prospects, if not before. Yet the dissolution
of partnership through the separation of types is also non-trivial as a result of the “ratchet
effect.” After the foreign government is revealed to be type-1, the home government
optimally proposes maximum cooperation for the rest of the relationship. However,
foreseeing this jump in cooperation level, type-2 foreign government postpones the
betrayal one period to get a higher deviation payoff in maximum cooperation stage. I
show that when the home government is optimistic enough about the foreign
government’s type, it prefers “testing” the foreign government in the beginning of their
relationship by proposing a high cooperation level. An interesting implication is that the
more patient that an uninformed government is, the more likely it resolves the uncertainty
in the beginning of relationship by “testing” its partner.
The literature on gradualism in trade agreements extensively utilizes a nonstationary economic environment as the source of dynamic adjustment in tariffs. Staiger
(1995) formalizes gradual tariff reduction in a self-enforcing trade agreement framework.
Existence of import competing sector workers with sector-specific skills provides rentgenerating potential of tariff hikes. Liberalization relocates a portion of these workers.
Once a worker is relocated from the import competing sector, she loses her sector-

5

specific skill with a given probability, which yields a non-stationary environment. As the
supply of workers with sector specific skills shrinks, high tariffs become less desirable
and the sustainable cooperative tariff drops. Therefore, initial progress in trade
liberalization enables further liberalization in the future. Similarly, Furusawa and Lai
(1999) show that gradualism emerges when adjustment costs arise because of labor
mobility among the sectors. Chisik (2003) explicitly recognizes the non-stationary aspect
of trading environment. In his paper, specialization and development of partner specific
capital decreases the most cooperative tariff within time. A small tariff reduction
provides further accumulation of capital in the export sector with a certain degree of
irreversibility, which in turn increases both the benefit of continuing the liberalization
and cost of a tariff war. Chisik (2009) analyzes multi-sector free trade agreements with an
emphasis on dynamic changes in the scope of linked agreements and the emergence of
zero-for-zero agreements. Linking agreements provide further liberalization in the
presence of irreversible partner specific costs and perfectly correlated noise across
sectors. As the correlation decreases, however, liberalization becomes more enforceable
in some sectors in an unlinked agreement. The paper also shows that unlinked agreements
will eventually be pursued as the body of linked agreements matures. In Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2005), frictions in capital mobility and lobbying lead to gradualism in
trade liberalization.
As opposed to previous literature, Bond and Park (2002) formalize a case where
the gradualism result does not depend on evolution of a state variable. Given asymmetric
country sizes, liberalization exhibits a non-stationary pattern when the small country
smoothes consumption over time. As the non-stationary and efficient trade agreement
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promises rising payoffs to the small country, most cooperative tariffs are reduced over
time through relaxation in its incentive constraint, which is the binding one. Conconi and
Perroni (2004) also focus on asymmetric country size as a source of dynamic change in
degree of liberalization, however with an emphasis on commitment issues in small
countries. Finally, Zissimos (2007) investigates the impact of GATT dispute settlement
procedure (specifically Article XXIII) on gradual liberalization.
My work differs from the first group of literature in the sense that I show
gradualism can emerge without adjustment costs. Similar to Bond and Park (2002),
economic environment is stationary in my model. However, unlike the second group of
literature, I do not use asymmetries between economies. Hence, my result of gradualism
is robust with changes in the economic environment. The game theoretic technique
employed in the present paper is similar to a long term partnership model with two-sided
incomplete information developed in Watson (1999) and Watson (2002). Formalizing
dynamic games with variable stakes and two types of players, the latter work describes
the equilibrium regimes where different types of players separate in the beginning since a
certain type of player 1 deviates, and level of cooperation rises gradually then after, under
commitment. The former paper models cooperation under renegotiation condition and
shows a quick separation phase followed by a gradual cooperation one. Furusawa and
Kawakami (2006) shows that gradualism arises in a two sided incomplete information
game with variable stakes and outside options. In this paper I characterize a long term
relationship with one-sided incomplete information and Prisoner’s Dilemma type payoff
structure. A major difference that brings my problem close to a screening framework is
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hierarchical relationship between players, i.e. home government has privilege to design
the contract.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic economic
environment and trade relationship between countries. I solve for a complete information
optimal cooperation model as a benchmark case. Section 3 introduces asymmetric
information into the model. I derive incentive constraints in a self-enforcing trade
agreement and define incentive feasible cooperation with respect to different types of the
foreign government and the optimal cooperation with respect to the home government.
The last section concludes the paper. Proofs are contained in the appendix.

I.II. THE MODEL
In this section, I present the characteristics of my basic model of trade between
two large countries. I start by defining the structure of trade within a simple framework; I
introduce an optimal agreement model with complete information where the home
government, observing conditions in the foreign country, proposes an incentive
compatible contract that maximizes its expected welfare.

Basic Set Up
I consider a two country partial equilibrium model, where both countries produce
goods in a continuous interval
goods and countries:
denote the local prices of good

. I assume that demand functions are identical across
, and

, where

and

in the home and foreign countries. All goods in the
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model are produced in both countries, however have different supplies:
and

. The corresponding home and foreign country export supply and import
,

demand functions are then:
, and

,
, respectively. I assume

and

, where

. It is

, and imports in the region

immediate that the home country exports in the region

. I will denote the former interval as export sector, and the latter one as import
sector for the home country. Countries, therefore, have identical supplies of goods within
a specific sector, and they are symmetric; i.e., the supplies of home export goods and
foreign exports goods are identical.
Each government imposes a specific import tariff,

and

on their importable

goods. Importers pay the world price of an imported good and the specific import tariff,
whereas exporters of that good get only the world price

and

, where the asterisk denotes foreign value. In the presence of nonprohibitive tariffs market clearing conditions provide the equilibrium world and local
prices. Solving
and

I obtain the equilibrium prices

with explicit solutions:

, and

. The

prices of import goods in the foreign country are found similarly.
Following the convention in the corresponding literature, I assume that each
government maximizes a social welfare function composed of consumer surplus,
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producer surplus and tariff revenues from import goods. Formally, social welfare on a
single exportable good in the home country is given by:

Welfare generated by a single importable good in the home country is:

I define the aggregate welfare in home country as the sum of welfares generated by
. As opposed to the

individual export and import goods:

home government, I assume that foreign government faces political economy
considerations in import competing goods. These considerations are represented by
identical weight parameters,

assigned to producer surpluses of respective goods

imported by the foreign country. Formally, the foreign country welfare on an importable
good is, then:

Foreign country political-economy parameter
possible values
values of

in each period, where

is drawn from a discrete set of
and

denote the low and high

respectively. Therefore, we associate a “state of nature” with the realized

political-economy parameter: A high (low) state denotes the realization of a high (low)
political economy parameter in an arbitrary period. On the other hand, the “type” of
foreign government is defined with respect to the probability of getting low state of
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nature in each period. A type-1 (good type) foreign government has probability

of

getting a low state of nature (good state) in a given period, whereas the likelihood of a
type-2 (bad type) draw for foreign government is defined with

where

The type of foreign government is determined by nature beforehand
and is fixed throughout the game as opposed to state of nature.
In the absence of a trade agreement, governments apply Nash tariffs in importable
goods,

which

unilaterally

and

maximize

their

own

welfares,

. Using the first order conditions one can show that

the foreign country Nash tariff is increasing in its political economy parameter. Because
of the identical demand and supply structures, unilaterally optimal tariffs, and therefore
welfares on goods in the same sector, are equal. This equality enable me remove
subscripts that denote different goods in the same sector. With no cooperative agreement
the relationship between the trade partners exhibits characteristics of a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game. Each country’s welfare is increasing in its own tariff but is
decreasing in partner’s tariff because of terms-of-trade deterioration. Jointly efficient
tariffs maximize the world welfare, but are undermined by unilateral incentives to
deviate.
A trade agreement specifies a sequence of cooperative tariffs
sequence of cooperation level

for

,

and a

, which denotes the

number of goods included in the agreement. I restrict attention to a symmetric and
stationary tariff case, where both countries apply the identical cooperative tariff
throughout the cooperative relationship, in order to focus on effects of cooperation level.
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This cooperative tariff is lower than the unilaterally optimal one, and can be equal to zero
as well. Any particular value, however, does not have a critical implication for my
purposes in this paper; therefore I do not specify it explicitly to avoid an unnecessary
restriction. Stage game payoffs are defined as the sum of cooperative welfares on
agreement goods and non-cooperative welfares on non-agreement goods. The cooperative
payoff of the home country in period t is:

Given the level of cooperation in an arbitrary period,
hand side in equation

, the first term on the right

denotes the sum of the welfares from export goods that are

not included in the agreement, the second term is the welfare from export goods that are
in the agreement, the third term is the welfare from import goods in the agreement, and
the final term is the welfare from import goods that are not included in the agreement.
The identical structure of demand and production across the goods in each sector enables
. I will write

us write this equation as

the welfare of foreign government in a high (low) state of nature with an over-bar (underbar). Figure 1 displays the payoff matrices for a bundle of goods in different states of
nature under the agreement.
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Low State of Nature
Betray

High State of Nature

Cooperate

Betray

Betray

Betray

Cooperate

Cooperate

Cooperate

Type 1:
Type 2:

Figure 1. Payoffs from a bundle of goods in different states of nature
under an agreement

In the absence of an external enforcement mechanism, I characterize a selfenforcing agreement that depends on credible threats of future punishments to enable
cooperation in a non-cooperative environment. I assume that governments abrogate the
agreement and permanently reverse to unilaterally optimal tariffs following a deviation
by either country. Nash reversion strategies imply that when a government betrays by
applying Nash tariffs, it prefers to do so in all import goods since the partner applies
Nash tariffs in all goods in the punishment stage. Stage game payoff of the betraying
foreign

government

in

a

low

state

of

nature

. Since the welfare on an

becomes

import good is always greater with unilaterally optimal tariffs by definition, the stage
game payoff in a deviation period is greater than the one in a cooperative period. The
payoff
others

in

the

Nash

reversion

period

has

the

lowest

value

among

. Payoffs of the home country are defined analogously.

However, I introduce an assumption about unilaterally optimal tariffs.
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Assumption 1. Foreign Nash tariffs are prohibitive.
The reasoning behind this assumption is as follows. Foreign government’s Nash
tariff changes with different political economy parameter values, which is bounced in
variations in home government welfares on export goods. However, I want to restrict the
mechanism through which the home government can extract signals about the type of
foreign government in my model with one-sided incomplete information. Therefore, the
practice of foreign government in non-agreement goods is assumed to provide no further
information about its type and state of nature. Nevertheless, this assumption provides
great simplification without changing qualitative results of my model. This condition is
represented by identical home government Nash payoffs in export goods in Figure 1. The
interaction between trading partners is then an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in
non-stationary identical issues with stochastic payoffs in each period. The next section
characterizes the equilibrium of this relationship in the absence of informational
asymmetries.
Stationary Cooperation in a Complete Information Environment
This section introduces a benchmark case with a long-term relationship in the
absence of informational asymmetry. I provide a non-result for the emergence of
gradualism in a complete information environment. The idea here is that when the home
government observes the probability of a shock in the foreign country, then whatever
policy is incentive compatible for a single good is also incentive compatible for the entire
import sector. The number of goods included in an agreement does not induce the foreign
government with more or less incentives to cooperate. The future costs of betrayal and
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the current benefits from it change proportionally with scope of an agreement. Similarly,
costs for the home government borne by the risk of foreign government betrayal rises in
proportion to the rise in benefits from cooperation. Hence, both governments prefer
cooperating at a maximum rate given that it is incentive compatible.
The game starts after the realization of foreign government’s type by nature in
period 0, and the home government proposes a contract upon observing this type.
Equilibrium is characterized by an incentive compatible path of cooperation level and
, to show this

tariffs. I consider a stationary cooperation level, i.e.

ex-post. A cooperative action profile is sustainable if payoff structure does not induce the
governments with a profitable one-shot deviation. I analyze the incentive structure of
foreign government in the presence of an agreement, and then go back to period 0 to
investigate the home government’s optimal contracting problem. I start with a type-1
foreign government. Incentive compatibility requires that:

denotes a onetime gain from deviation on a single good in a low

Where
state

of

nature.

Foreign

government

uses

expected

gain

from

an

, in order to calculate the future payoff

agreement,

stream. The expected gain is a weighted sum of gains in a high state of
nature

and in a low state

, since

the states are not correlated through consecutive periods. A notable aspect of these
incentive constraints is the non-existence of cooperation level in the explicit formulation
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even though they denote overall payoffs. This non-existence arises because the
cooperation level appears linearly on both sides of the inequalities 2 , hence are cancelled.
This shows that if a type-1 foreign government betrays (cooperates) in a complete
information environment with a stationary cooperation level, it does so regardless of the
time and cooperation level.
I now compare the two incentive constraints in terms of strictness to show that the
one in a high state of nature binds first. The following Lemma specifies some
characteristics of complete information game regarding the payoffs of foreign
government, which will be useful to determine the binding constraint.
Lemma 1. For small enough cooperative tariffs in foreign country,
(a) Gains from

cooperative agreement decreases in political economy parameter,

; therefore
(b) Gains

from

,

deviation

therefore

increases

in

political

economy

parameter

.

Using the results from Lemma 1, I see that the constraint in high state of nature
binds first. Intuitively, if a type-1 foreign government does not betray at a time when
domestic political pressures are at a peak, then it does not do so when the pressure is
lower. Solving

for the critical level of probability, I get a necessary condition

2

To see how the cooperation level is eliminated from these constraints we write them in the following way. For a type1
foreign
government
these
become
in
a
low
state
in a high state. Here
and
denote the continuation values following a
and
cooperative and non-cooperative action profile in the current period. Formally,
and

,

. When I plug the explicit forms of continuation values into the constraints,

cooperation levels are cancelled out since both sides contain it in multiplicative form.
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for cooperation

, where

. By Lemma 1, again, it is

straightforward to show that this critical level of probability decreases in discount factor
for high enough values. Therefore, the requirement regarding the frequency of a shock is
stricter for relatively impatient foreign governments.
I now describe the incentive compatibility issues for a type-2 foreign government.
A type-2 foreign government characterizes a “risky” partner for the home government as
opposed to the “safe” type-1 foreign government in my model.

To introduce this

characteristic, I start with a key assumption that will hold throughout this paper.
Assumption 2.

, where

.

Remember that the foreign government betrays regardless of time in a complete
information environment with stationary cooperation levels. Assumption 2 formally
specifies that a type-2 foreign government always betrays in a high state of nature.
Hence, the realization of a political economy shock is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for a type-2 foreign government to deviate from cooperative path. The
incentive constraint of a type-2 foreign government in a low state of nature is different
than the one for type-1 in the sense that the former constraint incorporates possible future
betrayal payoffs. Formally,

which can be reduced to

. It is straightforward to show that for

, this inequality is satisfied trivially, and for discount rate values lower than
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this critical level there is no solution. These characteristics illustrate that for a sufficiently
patient type-2 foreign government, a relationship with stationary cooperative level is
sustainable as long as a shock does not occur.
In a complete information environment, the type of foreign government, the
associated minimum probability that provides cooperation, and the actual probabilities
are all common knowledge. Therefore, the home government is provided with the ability
to tailor the agreement to maximize its expected payoffs. It is obvious that I have
equilibria in which the foreign government betrays in the first period, and the home
government does not propose any cooperation. These cases arise when sufficiently small
probabilities violate the incentive constraints of foreign government, i.e.,

and

. However, I shall focus on more interesting cooperative equilibria in which the
foreign government cooperates perpetually and the home government proposes positive
cooperation level. Incentive compatibility condition for the home government interacting
with a type-1 foreign government is:

Similar to foreign government incentive constraints, this condition rules out a profitable
one-shot deviation for the home government. In the absence of an external enforcing
mechanism, the agreement proposed by the home government needs to be credible, i.e.,
the home government should have no incentive to betray. The following proposition
provides an important result regarding the complete information case.
Proposition 1. If incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both governments,
then a trade agreement with maximum cooperation in all periods Pareto dominates
others in a complete information environment.
18

Proposition 1 shows that the home government proposes a maximum cooperation
in the beginning of a relationship, when incentive constraints are satisfied. Using this
result to define the cooperative continuation value on the right hand side, I get
where
inequality

denotes the maximum cooperation level. Therefore,

can be reduced to

. When

and the home

government is patient enough, cooperation starts at maximum level and is sustained
afterwards. If foreign government is known to be type-2, then home government needs to
incorporate the probability of high state of nature into account, since the foreign
government betrays in that case. Incentive constraint for the home government becomes:

I obtain

using the results

from Proposition 1, which involves the risk of being betrayed in each period. Plugging
this in

and solving for the minimum discount factor that satisfies the incentive

constraint, I get

, which can be shown to be greater than the value in case

of a type-1 foreign government. Therefore, there exists an interval of discount factor
values where home government cooperates only with a type-1 foreign government. A
greater probability of low state of nature for a type-2 government implies that the home
government needs to be more patient to propose full cooperation.
This result shows that cooperation level proposed in a complete information trade
agreement is given by the following conditions:
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As a result, given that the probabilities of a shock are low enough to provide
cooperation for both types of the foreign government, home government employs its
privilege to design a contract in order to implement the optimal level of cooperation
immediately in the absence of informational asymmetry in my model. The home
government’s incentive constraints do not face dynamic changes since there is no update
in the state variables of maximization problem. Therefore, the optimal cooperation does
not exhibit a gradual path. Stochastic states of nature do not contribute much to the
analysis besides changing it from an interim maximization to an ex-ante maximization
problem for the home government.
My result for the complete information case is analogous to the findings reported
in the linkage literature (such as Chisik, 2009). I model identical structure in demand and
supply conditions. Combined with the assumption of identical tariffs across the goods
within an import sector, the degree of enforcement is also identical across the bundle of
goods in an agreement. This identity shows that there is no slack enforcement power that
could be transferred to other goods through linking separate agreements. Therefore,
whatever is enforceable for a single bundle is also enforceable for the entire sector. This
result holds both for the static and incremental linkage story. I now focus on my
gradualism results and condition that give rise to them.
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I. III. NON-STATIONARY COOPERATION UNDER INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
I solve an infinitely repeated game with stochastic states of nature and one-sided
incomplete information in this section. I assume that state of nature in each period and
type of foreign government are privately observed by the foreign government. However,
the prior probability of foreign government being type-1 (
common knowledge, where

) and type-2 (

) are

. Probabilities of low and high states of nature

conditional on foreign government’s type are identical with complete information
scenario. Game follows the identical path described in previous section 3 .
Given incomplete information structure, home government faces the problem of
choosing an optimal cooperation path

that maximizes welfare. Remember that

the home government observes only actions of the foreign government in each period.
Let

be the sequence of the probabilities that the home government assigns to the

event of foreign government being type-1 in respective periods. Each
posterior belief upon observing the foreign government’s action in period

denotes the
, and is

and afterwards. This belief evolves in a

used to construct expectations for period
Bayesian fashion, formally:

3

To put this environment in perspective, note that it is similar to a two-type screening model and repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game. However, there are both static and dynamic differences. In a standard principal-agent framework, the
“good” type agent (efficient or low cost) has an incentive to imitate the “bad” type (inefficient or high cost), which
instigates the principal to decrease transaction with the latter one to reduce the information rent extracted by the former
type. The ability of principal to propose a menu of contracts with respective transfers assures this result. On the other
hand, the agency problem therefore optimal contracting issue is ignored in a standard repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game. My model unifies these two environments in the sense that we have payoff structure of a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game with agency problem. The good type agent (type-1 foreign government) is the one who pays for its
inability to reveal its type, whereas the bad type agent (type-2 foreign government) extracts information rent. The
principal (home government) is constraint to propose a single contract that specifies a unique cooperation level.
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In order to define this posterior probability in terms of the prior belief,

, I iterate it:

The only exception is the first period, where there is no new information available before
players move, hence home government uses the prior belief

. It is obvious that

after enough periods of successful cooperation this belief will converge to
one,

. I define the home government’s belief of foreign government acting

cooperatively in current period by

. This probability is composed of probability of the

foreign government to be a type-1, and probability of nature choosing a low state if it is
type-2. This corresponds to home government’s subjective belief of not getting a type-2
foreign government with a high-state of nature. Formally,

. Iterating

this, I get the subjective probability of foreign government cooperating in ’th period
after period , given that it cooperates in period

:

Cooperation levels specified in the contract for each period and belief sequence,
together with governments’ strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if: Foreign
government’s actions are optimal given the cooperation level in each period; home
government’s actions are optimal given its posterior beliefs and subsequent strategies in
each period; and the posterior belief is derived from the prior, foreign government’s
strategy and observed action profile. These conditions require that governments act
optimally at any point in history of the game. Self-enforcing character of the agreement
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eliminates commitment concerns, yet following Laffont and Tirole (1990) I assume that
the initial contract is designed to incorporate additional information. Intuitively, Bayesian
updating mechanism alters home government’s incentive scheme after each period,
relaxing the incentive constraint and providing further cooperation. Both types of foreign
government receive higher payoffs with higher cooperation, therefore renegotiation is
allowed. However, without loss of generality, the original contract is designed to avoid
future renegotiation.
I can now characterize the incentive structure of the foreign government.
Incentive constraints for different types of foreign government differ from complete
information case due to non-stationary character of cooperation level through consecutive
periods. Remember that in a complete information case, where cooperation is stationary,
net balance of discounted gains and punishments is the single factor that provides the
foreign government with the incentive to act cooperatively or not. Therefore this
incentive form is also stationary during the entire game. On the contrary, in an
incomplete information game I have inter-temporal incentives in addition to static
balance of one period gains and punishments. An expected augmentation in stage game
cooperative payoff in the future because of the rising level of cooperation provides an
additional incentive for the foreign government to cooperate in the current period.
Therefore, postponing betrayal becomes profitable if cooperation level increases fast
enough to more than compensate for the time discounting.
I start with a type-1 foreign government. As mentioned in the previous section, I
assume that this type of foreign government cooperates perpetually throughout the game.
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And as in the previous section, the incentive constraint for this type binds in a high state
of nature. Formally:

Intuitively, this condition states that discounted sum of expected future gains from an
agreement, which is contingent on probabilities of different state of natures and the
increasing level of cooperation, should be at least as large as benefit from betraying in
current period, which is a function of current cooperation level. This condition would be
null had the cooperation level could grow infinitely in the future. But existence of an
upper bound implies a structural change in above mentioned condition once the
maximum level of cooperation is reached. Solving this incentive constraint, I get the
condition for perpetual cooperation once the maximum cooperation level is attained,
, which is identical with complete information case.
Solution for a type-2 foreign government incorporates the fact that it always
betrays in a high state of nature. The incentive constraint for this type in a low state of
nature reflects this effect through the alteration in cooperative continuation values.
Formally:

Intuitively, current cooperative behavior is conditioned on the comparison between
discounted future gains from agreement with a possible gain from betrayal, and the
current net benefit of betraying. The left hand-side of the inequality incorporates the
intertemporal gains due to non-stationary level of cooperation. The condition under
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which type-2 foreign government cooperates perpetually once the maximum level of
cooperation is reached is found analogously, and identical to the one in complete
. I next focus on pooling and separating equilibria.

information section:

Gradualism in Cooperation
Suppose

and

, therefore both types of foreign government

cooperates perpetually once maximum level of cooperation is attained. Then I get the
following result.
Lemma 2. If

and

, then both

and

do not bind

unless the cooperation level decreases sufficiently within time.
Intuitively, Lemma 2 implies that the home government can only extract “weak”
signals from foreign government’s cooperative actions. Then, revelation of the type of
foreign government in pooling equilibrium occurs only when betrayal is observed, which
is reserved for type-2 foreign government in a high state of nature. Nevertheless, the
home government’s subjective belief about the foreign government being type-1
increases gradually as cooperative action profile is observed through periods. A selfenforcing agreement requires incentive compatibility for the home government as well.
Formally in period :

,
Plugging the explicit payoffs in, I get:
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Nash cooperation value is deterministic and defined as discounted sum of payoffs when
unilaterally optimal tariffs are applied. The cooperative continuation value for the
decision maker in period is formally defined as:

Therefore, there a recursive structure in cooperation values. There are two
features that worth pointing out here: First, there is more than one (two, specifically) nonstationary variables, the belief q and cooperation level . Second, both of these nonstationary variables are bounded above: i.e., the belief has an upper limit of one, and the
level of cooperation is limited by amount of goods traded between countries. However,
although the upper limit is reached for latter one in the course of game, as I will show, the
upper limit for the belief is never attained in a pooling equilibrium. I take advantage of
this structural change in the game by defining the critical period in which the cooperation
level reaches to its maximal level, and analyze the rest of the game with reference to that
period in the proof of Lemma 3. I call the subsection of the long-term relationship where
the level of cooperation is stationary at the maximum level the “maximum cooperation
phase”, and the subsection where cooperation level rises gradually the “gradual
cooperation phase.” First, I define a general form for continuation value at an arbitrary
point in time, without signifying the structural break point. Solving
this general form:
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iteratively, I get

Intuitively, let be the first period with maximum level of cooperation, then continuation
is the discounted sum of expected payoffs from cooperation in both

value in period

phases. Expected stage game payoffs increase in gradual cooperation phase as long as
governments act cooperatively. This characteristic is determined by two non-stationary
variables I mentioned. Holding the level of cooperation constant, expectation of future
payoffs increase solely because the home government assigns a higher probability to the
foreign government acting favorably in the future. This increase in belief, in turn,
manipulates the continuation values in both phases of the relationship. Given a higher
probability of favorable play in the future, the home governments’ incentive constraint is
relaxed after a cooperative period. This slackness in the constraint provides some room
for further cooperation that makes the incentive constraint bind again. Therefore the
continuation value increases because of these two effects after each successfully
cooperative action profile in gradual cooperation phase. The following lemma
summarizes these findings.
Lemma 3.

for the home government as a result of:

i.

in maximum cooperation phase (pure belief effect), and

ii.

and

in gradual cooperation phase.

I now show technically that cooperation level increases in gradual cooperation phase.
The home government can increase its expected payoff by increasing the level of
cooperation when there is slackness in its incentive constraint. Therefore, optimality
requires the incentive constraint to bind in every period in gradual cooperation phase.
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Using

, the level of cooperation that satisfies the incentive constraint with

equality can be written as:

by Lemma 3 and

Since
show that

by definition of

and

,I

. The following proposition specifies gradualism in my model.

Proposition 2. By Lemmas 2 and 3, and using

the optimal contract proposes a

gradual transition to maximum cooperation phase in a pooling equilibrium
where

and

.

In order to derive the optimal cooperation explicitly, I employ two characteristics
of the game: The home government selects the highest possible cooperation level that exante satisfies its incentive constraint based on the subjective belief in each period 4 . This
selection implies that home government is indifferent between betraying and cooperating
in each period. More interestingly, being indifferent between cooperation and betrayal in
two consecutive periods implies being indifferent between betraying in the first period
and cooperating in the first but betraying in the second period 5 . I take advantage of this
property to characterize the optimal increments in level of cooperation. In an arbitrary
period t I formally show this as:

4

Otherwise, it could increase the cooperation level and get a higher payoff without violating incentive constraints of
foreign government, which contradicts with optimality condition.

5

A simple example helps elaborate this. Assume there is a two period game with discounting (discount factor
where
a player faces the problem of choosing between left (L) and right (R) in both periods. In the first period, L ends the
game, whereas R starts the second period. Choosing L and R gives the same payoff in the second period, call this . In
order for the player to be indifferent between L and R in the first period, L needs to earn him
whereas R gives
plus the discounted payoff from second period. In this case the strategies of playing L in the first period, and R in the
.
first period and L in the second period both earns him
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Where the left hand side of the equation shows the home government’s payoff on
deviation in including possibility of foreign government betraying simultaneously. The
right hand side of the equation, on the other hand, describes the payoff generated by
cooperating in the current period and betraying in the next one, with the payoffs
associated with possible betrayal by the foreign country in the current period or the next
one. Plugging definitions of welfares in, and employing gains from actions notation, I get
the explicit correlation between two consecutive cooperation levels:

Note that this relationship is relevant only in gradual cooperation phase. Once the
maximum level of cooperation is attained, additional beliefs favoring the cooperation
only increases expected future payoffs slightly. However, this correlation gives us a welldefined path of optimal cooperation until it reaches a maximum. Setting

,

gives us the level of belief sufficient to reach maximum cooperation:
. It is immediate that

decreases in

. Therefore, the less likely a

type-2 foreign government will experience a political economy shock, the faster
maximum cooperation is reached in a pooling equilibrium. Next section displays the case
where different types of foreign government are separated relatively quickly in the course
of the game.

29

Bicycle Theory and Testing the Partner
I now focus on a case where type-2 foreign government reveals its type even
before a high state of nature is realized. Suppose

, so that type-2 foreign

government betrays in case of maximum cooperation. This condition implies that the
type-2 foreign government betrays whenever the cooperation level remains stationary for
the rest of the game. This characteristic changes the structure of cooperation dramatically.
If the home government wants to keep a type-2 foreign government in cooperative
relationship, it needs to provide sufficient inter-temporal incentives. Enhancing the
cooperation level through consecutive periods postpones foreign government’s betrayal,
but never eliminates it since the level function is bounded above. Terminating a
relationship with a type-2 foreign government is not trivial. Renegotiation-proofness of
the agreement implies that the home government takes advantage of additional
information revealed in each period to redesign the contract optimally 6 . Therefore after a
critical period where types are separated with type-2 betraying, home government
proposes maximum cooperation if trading partner has not betrayed. However, home
government should also be concerned about the “ratchet effect.” Observing the proposed
cooperation path, the type-2 foreign government can gain substantially by pooling with a
type-1 foreign government. Postponing betrayal one more period provides it with betrayal
payoff in the maximum cooperation stage. This effect makes separation of types more

6

Assuming contract being designed at the outset of the game does not change this property. The initial contract
conditions the path of cooperation on observed action profile in each period.
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costly for home government, since it needs to provide more incentives for the trading
partner to reveal its type 7 .
I start with deriving the cooperative path that provides intertemporal incentives
and make the type-2 foreign government delay betrayal. The condition

implies

that there is no cooperative continuation value in period , where the level of cooperation
is supposed to reach a maximum level. I can define the incentive constraint of a type-2
foreign government in period

as:

I get the maximum value of cooperation level that makes the type-2 foreign government
indifferent

between

betraying

in

consequtive

periods

as

the

following:

. It is straightforward to show

that

. Manipulating

shows that the term inside the

brackets is smaller than one. Solving for the maximum incentive compatible levels of
cooperation backwards, I obtain a general rule for an arbitrary period:

7
We do not have further complications related with the good type partner in our model. A good type agent might “takethe-money-and-run” when principal raises incentives to separate types in a standard dynamic principal agent
framework. This might make the incentive constraints bind both ‘upward” and “downward”. Since a type-1 foreign
government prefers perpetual cooperation we do not need to worry about this.
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This rule defines a convex path increasing in time. Intuitively, it represents the minimum
increment in cooperation level that makes foreign government indifferent between
betraying in an arbitrary period and postponing it for the next one.
Ratcheting is manifested in the following way: A one shot-deviation from
equation

in early stages does not induce type-2 foreign government reveal its type.

Since revelation of type is followed by maximum cooperation or no cooperation at all,
home government needs to propose at least

in an arbitrary period to “test” its trading

partner credibly. Figure 2 displays two cases. The left panel shows the ratchet effect
baffling a non-credible test; whereas the right panel shows a successful separation in the
first period of relationship. Note that if home government could fully commit to the
gradual path (bold concave curve in panel a), then a small deviation from incentive
compatible path for the type-2 foreign government would successfully separate the types.
However, in the absence of full commitment, ex-post efficiency through renegotiation
upon complete revelation of types requires a higher initial incentive to implement
separation.

(a) A Non‐credible “Test”

(b) A Credible “Test”

Figure 2: Incentive Structure and Testing in Separating Equilibrium
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I now characterize the conditions under which testing is an equilibrium strategy
for home government. Expected payoff from a credible-test strategy for the home
government in the first period is given by:

This is basically a weighted sum of expected payoffs when the foreign country is type-1
(cooperates) and type-2 (betrays) using the prior belief. Note that cooperative
continuation value in a separating equilibrium is

since the home

government’s posterior belief is equal to one after the first period. It is obvious that the
equation

is increasing in prior belief

. The more likely a foreign government is

a good partner, the higher is expected payoff from a testing strategy. Following incentive
constraint gives us the condition under which testing in the first period is an equilibrium
strategy for home government:

Intuitively, the expected payoff from the testing strategy needs to be greater than
or equal to the payoff from betraying in the first period after proposing a testing strategy
in the contract for the home government. I can define this as

.

Plugging the value of

I

I displayed before in the above inequality and solving for

get:
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The following proposition summarizes conditions for the existence of this separating
equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Given

,

and

equilibrium in which home government proposes

, there exists a separating
and

conditional on cooperative action in the first period. Therefore the type of the foreign
government is revealed in the first period, and cooperation continues with maximum level
from the second period onward if the foreign government does not betray in the first
period.
Corollary 1.

is decreasing in .

The result by Corollary 1 is interesting in the sense that it shows that more patient
governments are more likely to resolve uncertainties as a result of informational
asymmetry in the beginning of a relationship by eliminating the “bad type” partners.
Intuitively, gradual adjustment enables cooperation but at the same time some payoff is
lost because maximum cooperation is postponed. Therefore, the higher discount factor
increases the discounted value of this additional payoff that can be earned by maximizing
cooperation quickly.

I.IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper helps understand the structure of cooperation between countries in the
presence of informational asymmetry. In the absence of incomplete information, the
home government observes the probability of a foreign government to experience
political economy shocks in the form of protectionism in each period. Given that this
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probability is low enough to satisfy the foreign government’s incentive constraint, and
that the home government is patient enough, partners start the relationship with
maximum cooperation. I show that home government needs to be patient enough for the
partnership to be sustainable, when this probability is relatively high. Nevertheless,
cooperation does not exhibit dynamic variation in a complete information environment.
Non-stationary cooperation emerges when the foreign government’s probability
of experiencing political economy shock is privately observed. I consider a case where a
foreign government betrays perpetually with or without political economy shock
realization if probability of the shock is relatively small. However, the foreign
government prefers betraying when the political economy shock is realized if this
probability is relatively high. The home government hesitates to start cooperation at a
maximum level in this case. Using the privilege to design the contract, it proposes
gradually increasing cooperation level conditional on cooperative action profiles. The
home government becomes more optimistic about its partner as it cooperates through
successive periods. I show that the threshold level of belief sufficient for the home
government to propose maximum cooperation is increasing in the probability of shock.
Hence, maximum cooperation is attained faster with low probability of shock.
I next consider a case where the foreign government prefers betraying even before
a shock is realized when probability of political economy shock is high enough. In this
case, the home government needs to provide this type of foreign government with
sufficient intertemporal incentives to keep it in partnership. These incentives are in the
form of increasing level of cooperation. I show that this necessary increment is
decreasing in discount factor: Patient governments can sustain a longer cooperative
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relationship as long as a shock is not realized. The home government might prefer
“testing” the trading-partner in the beginning of relationship by proposing a high enough
cooperation level that violates foreign government’s incentive constraint if it has a high
probability of shock. Interestingly, I see that the minimum prior belief that makes this
testing attainable is the decrease in discount factor. The more patient is home
government, the more likely it prefers resolving uncertainty in the beginning of
relationship by rectifying the “bad” type partner.
A potential limitation of my analysis is its inability to refer sector-based
composition of agreement under different supply schemes. I believe that non-uniform and
non-asymmetric conditions in different sectors may provide significant enrichment for
analysis of trade agreements. I also believe that further work is needed to understand
optimal dynamic behavior of governments under asymmetric information.
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II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT:
(WHEN) DOES LINKING THE AGREEMENTS HELP?

II.I. INTRODUCTION
Distinctions between international trade and tax policies become blurred as
further international investment deepens globalization. On the one hand, de facto tariff
policies reflect the effect of international investment patterns, on the other hand,
governments increasingly explore the prospects of their income tax system for
protectionism (see Brauner, 2005). However, the institutional framework regulating
international cooperation in these issues does not reflect this connectivity. International
trade and tax regimes consist of fragmented legal constructs which deal with proliferating
trade and investment independently. Trade liberalization has been successfully promoted
and coordinated by a series of multilateral agreements, whereas the cooperation in
international investment is predominantly served by bilateral tax treaties. Two regimes
have recently faced escalated tension because of this mismatch between fragmented legal
framework and interconnected economic structure8 . This tension has raised considerable
efforts in various disciplines to advance a method for reconciling the two regimes.
Among the proposals are a multilateral agreement for tax issues in services and

8

Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) dispute between European Communities (EC) and United States (US)
in 1998 is an interesting example in this regard. US Congress enacted FSC regime as a mechanism to
encourage exports. Income from export related activities through FSC's, which were required to carry out
substantial economic activities outside the US, were partially exempted from income taxes as opposed to
the application of foreign tax credits for other international commerce. EC claimed that this partial tax
exemption meets the definition of a subsidy since it does not apply to all income earned abroad but covers
only export related earnings, violating the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) of
World Trade Organization (WTO). US argued that WTO should not be involved in the dispute for a
number of jurisdictional reasons, and claimed that the matter should be resolved under the framework of
current bilateral tax treaties. This request was rejected. EC was permitted by arbitrator to impose $4 billion
sanctions in tariffs on selected imports from the US (McDaniel, 2004).
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investment (Avi-Yonah and Slemrod, 2002), establishment of an International Tax
Organization (Brauner, 2005), and maintaining the current system, as a normative tax
structure and free trade principles are not in conflict (McDaniel, 2004). This paper
investigates the option of linking Free Trade Agreements and Tax Treaties in terms of its
implications for welfare and enforcement of cooperation. I conclude that linking the two
agreements provide further cooperation between governments when there is significant
asymmetry between the countries. Without asymmetry linkage does not generate any
further enforcement power even when the issues are inherently linked because of
spillovers; but it does not reduce the cooperation either. However, this last result changes
when the linkage is established under limited punishments. I show that linking the
agreements may actually reduce the cooperation when Withdrawal of Equal Concessions
(WEC) rule of WTO is applied.
There are three principal ways in which a country might employ its trade and tax
policy variables for protectionist purposes. First, it could favor domestic products over
foreign products by imposing import tariffs. Second, it could favor domestic products
over foreign products by providing income tax exemptions on export related activities.
Finally, it could favor domestic producers over foreign producers by discriminating in
income tax on a residency basis. Cooperation among governments to prevent
discrimination against foreign products through import tariffs and related non-tariff
barriers is coordinated by multilateral agreements such as General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and is relatively well understood in the literature. The second type of
protectionism favors domestic products in foreign markets. Among the common practices
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are providing deductions in income taxes for domestically produced inputs 9 , and
deferring the income tax only in export related earnings until an actual distribution is
made 10 . The activities in this department are prohibited and regulated under 1979 GATT
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM). The third type of
protectionism, where a government taxes foreign enterprises operating in its territory
more heavily than the domestic producers in similar conditions, is the domain of bilateral
tax treaties.
Bilateral tax treaties basically disentangle transnational tax base, which otherwise
contain a disagreement between residence (enterprise's home country) and source-based
(the country where income is generated) taxation principles. Revenues are shifted from
source to residence jurisdictions under tax treaties. The revenue transfer might occur in
two channels: A lower source tax limits the tax burden of enterprises investing abroad, or
the countries applying the credit method for double-taxation-relief can collect the residual
tax on income earned abroad when the source tax is lowered. Tax treaties usually
designate a reduction in statutory rates of withholding tax implemented on foreign

9

There are several examples for this type of act. Foreign Sales Corporation legislation provided a tax
exemption for FSC's conditional on a rule of origin: “no more than 50% of the fair market value of the
exported property could be attributable to articles imported into the US” (McDaniel, 2004). Similarly,
Sweden imposed a fifteen percent tax on premiums paid by Swedish residents to foreign life insurance
companies, as opposed to no taxes on premiums paid to Swedish companies; and Denmark provided more
business deductions for meetings at Danish tourist sites than the ones at foreign sites (Graetz&Warren,
2006).
10

The US Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) enactment of 1971 provides a good example in
this case. A DISC was defined as a corporation with at least 95% of its assets devoted to export related
activities and at least 95% of its income must be generated by export related activities. Income tax for
DISC's were deferred, with no interest charges, until an actual distribution is made to its parent corporation.
This was considered to be an interest-free loan from the government, and was constituted an export subsidy
in the GATT panel (McDaniel, 2004).
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enterprises on a reciprocal basis 11 . Therefore, governments prefer different taxation
principles depending on their net investment flow in relation to the partner. Developed
countries prefer residence based taxation, whereas developing countries favor source
based taxation in a tax treaty. This asymmetry in tax preferences rebounds in the
composition of bilateral tax treaties all over the world. A significant majority of more
than 2500 tax treaties are between developed nations 12 . The affirmative result in this
paper indicates that limitations against cooperation between developed and developing
nations, which arise from the mismatch between asymmetric investment flows and
reciprocity requirement in tax treaties, could be overcome by linking the tax treaty with
free trade agreements. The idea here is that the developing country is the “short-side” in a
tax treaty since an equal tax reduction in both countries reduces its net revenues. On the
contrary, the developed country is the “short-side” of a free trade agreement because of
export-dependence of the developing country. Linking in this case serves as a transfer
payment to the “short-side” in a specific agreement for undertaking further concessions it
would not do otherwise. Therefore, linking helps countries aggregate dispersed
enforcement power and reallocate it efficiently, which increase the cooperation both in
trade and tax policies. This aspect of linkage has been analyzed in different contexts with
similar results in the literature (for environmental agreements see Cesar & de Zewe,
11

OECD Model Convention limits source country tax on dividends to 5% for owners of 25% or more
shares of the enterprise and 15% for others (Avi-Yonah&Slemrod, 2002).
12

The OECD Model Convention, which is adopted in all of these treaties, puts more weight on residence
based taxation. Article 5 of OECD-MC states that “Profits can only be taxed in the source state, if they are
attributed to a permanent establishment. Similarly, Articles 10-12 limit the degree of taxation for dividends,
interests and loyalty payments at source. However, there are limitations on residence country as well.
Article 23 states that residence government is obliged to provide relief from double taxation in cases of full
or limited source taxation, which can be in the form of tax credits or exemptions (Rixen, 2008). An earlier
version of United Nations Model Convention emphasized source based taxation, but was modified in later
versions.
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1996; for regional trade agreements between large and small countries see Abrego et al.,
2001 and Limão 2002). I report non-results for linkage with symmetric countries.
To elaborate these results, I use a two country-two goods model with goods and
capital flowing in both directions. In the absence of an agreement, governments apply
unilaterally optimal import tariffs and FDI taxes, which are jointly inefficient. Therefore,
the non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by tariffs and taxes that are too high, and
little international trade and investment. Governments overcome this inefficiency by
maintaining cooperation in each policy with a separate agreement in the benchmark case.
The cooperative relationship in each agreement is constructed as an infinitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma game, where the Nash reversion threat provides incentive
compatibility for sufficiently patient governments. A no-linkage regime is identified with
confinement of punishment in the policy where deviation is observed. Following the
common application in literature, I first define the linkage regime under Nash reversion
strategies when betrayal is observed in either or both agreements, to change this
assumption later. I show that the structure of enforcement does not change much under
linkage when countries are symmetric and trade and investment issues are independent,
i.e., there is no interaction between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and production of
goods, besides reallocating enforcement capacity from one agreement to the other if
necessary. I specify two cases with interdependent trade and FDI: First, foreign
investment generates technological spillovers in the export sector of the host country, i.e.,
the cost of producing the export good is a decreasing function of FDI inflow. Second,
FDI has technological spillovers in the import competing sector of host country. The
former type of spillover does not change cooperation structure in this case since tariffs
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and taxes are strategically independent in host country welfare function. On the contrary,
policy arguments are strategic complements when there is import-biased type of
spillovers. Intuitively, the strategic complementarity between FDI taxes and import tariffs
reflects the fact that protectionism in tariff policy has greater welfare gains when
domestic producers are less efficient in import competing industries. In other words, a tax
hike increases marginal returns on tariff by increasing the cost of production for the
import competing industry. Costs rise since foreign investment decreases in tax rate,
which leads to lower technological spillovers. Therefore, a simultaneous deviation in
both policies brings a greater gain than sum of the gains from deviation in each policy. I
show that, linkage under these conditions cannot provide further cooperation in both
policies at the same time. However, it cannot reduce enforcement either, since a
simultaneous deviation is always an option even under a no-linkage regime.
I next analyze linking the free trade agreements with tax treaties under the
conditions defined by GATT rules. Specifically, I am interested in showing the effects of
limited punishments on enforcement when cross-retaliation is allowed. As for the
magnitude of punishments, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) implements an equivalence standard (Withdrawal of
Equivalent Concessions-WEC), where retaliation should be equal to or below the
nullification or impairment 13 . Type of the retaliation is set by Article 22.3 of DSU under
three-stage retaliation: A parallel retaliation is defined as a punishment by requesting

13

Bown and Ruta (2008) provide an economic interpretation for “equivalence” of retaliation with original
nullification or impairment.
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party in the same sector(s) as that in which nullification or impairment has been found 14 .
A cross-sector retaliation is applicable only in services trade and intellectual property
rights issues, since retaliation across goods is already classified as within sector
punishment. Finally, a cross-agreement retaliation is suspending concessions or other
obligations under another covered agreement 15 . The three stage retaliation process
restricts the use of cross-sector and cross-agreement retaliations significantly. The
requesting party must first elaborate why parallel retaliation is not practicable or effective
in case of cross-sector retaliation request. Similarly, it needs to demonstrate why parallel
and cross-sector retaliations are not practicable or effective in case of cross-agreement
retaliation request 16 . The term “not effective” implies inability to induce compliance and
existence of substantial harm for the complaining party in this case. My main result in
this paper confirms the intuition behind the restriction of cross-retaliation across tax and
trade agreements.
In order to elaborate my main result, I drop the Nash reversion assumption. I
formalize the dispute settlement process under different regimes as follows: 1. Under a
no-linkage regime, a deviation from the cooperative path is punished by withdrawal of
14

Sector means all goods if the dispute has aroused in goods trade, i.e. punishment in any traded good as a
response to betrayal in another one is considered to be parallel retaliation. In case of services, sector is
identified as in the current “Services Sectoral Classification List”, i.e. educational services, communication
services etc. In case of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), each category of
property rights such as trademarks, copyrights and patents of TRIPS Agreement is considered a sector
(Shadikhodjaev, 2009).

15

For goods, an agreement denotes whole multilateral and plurilateral agreements on trade in goods, of
course if both parties to the dispute are parties thereto. Whereas for services and intellectual property rights
it points GATS and TRIPS, respectively (Shadikhodjaev, 2009).

16

In US-Antigua and Barbuda dispute, the Appellate Body found US restrictions on gambling and betting
services violating US market access commitments under the GATS. Antigua and Barbuda requested
authorization to suspend its concessions and obligations under TRIPS Agreement, since a retaliation under
GATS was not practicable or effective due to significant asymmetry between the parties.
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equivalent concessions within the same agreement, i.e., both governments deviate from
the cooperative equilibrium by the initial amount of deviation forever. A failure to
comply with this limited punishment path invokes standard grim-trigger punishments 17 ,
2. Under a linkage regime the requesting party is allowed to withdraw equivalent
concessions in the other agreement upon observing betrayal in a specific issue, i.e., each
party deviates from the cooperative equilibrium path by an amount equivalent to the
initial deviation in different agreements forever, but complies in the other agreement. A
failure to implement this punishment path invokes standard grim-trigger play. I first show
that limited punishment under no-linkage regime induces a deviating government to
apply a limited deviation, i.e., the deviation tariff under limited punishment is smaller
than the one under maximum punishment. Intuitively, a deviating government imposes
the highest beneficial tariff and/or tax in a deviation period when the maximum
punishment will be applied regardless the level of deviation. On the other hand, when
punishment is tailored to the deviation, possible reductions in future punishments restrict
the optimal tax/tariff level in a deviation period. I then show that allowing cross
retaliation increases the deviation tax/tariff when the home and foreign tariffs (taxes) are
strategic substitutes in each country's welfare function. Finally, I show that more trade
disputes arise under the linkage regime. The idea here is that, when cross-retaliation is
allowed, the punisher prefers it over parallel retaliation since it generates a relatively
higher average payoff during the punishment phase. However, the motive to reduce the
17

Our motivation here is as follows: when a deviator fails to comply in its punishment, or when a punisher
applies more aggressive retaliation than the initial deviation, this is considered to be an “abusive” deviation
and punished at a maximum level. Under general international law, a state violating a rule must “cease that
act, if it's continuing” in conformity with cessation and non-repetition principles. These principles are
meant to reinforce a “continuing legal relationship” between the states concerned (Shadikhodjaev, 2009).
See Zissimos (2007) for a similar interpretation.
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cost of retaliation for punisher also reduces the magnitude of punishment for initial
deviator. Therefore, betrayal at a limited scale becomes beneficial for relatively impatient
governments.
My results correlate to different classes of work in the literature. Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) analyze firm collusion under multimarket interaction. They recognize
the enforcement reallocation aspect of linkage when applied by asymmetric firms.
However, linkage does not facilitate further cooperation on aggregate level when firms
are symmetric. Besides, linkage never reduces the aggregate enforceability. Spagnolo
(1999a) extends the Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by showing that an increase in the
cooperation in both markets through linkage is possible if firms have concave objective
functions. Strategic interactions become interdependent in this case since the concavity
generates “scale economies” in how firms evaluate the profits. Therefore, more collusion
in both policies become feasible when profits are submodular in objective functions.
Spagnolo (1999b) applies this framework to international agreements. In this case,
governments value the payoffs on de facto independent issues nonlinearly. Limão (2005)
relaxes this condition and allows structural interdependence between the issues. In his
story, traded goods have a negative production externality which might have a crossborder effect. Governments use import tariffs and externality taxes as policy variables,
however since the Terms of Trade and production externalities in the absence of
agreements, a non-cooperative equilibrium is identified with high tariffs and low
externality taxes. When tariffs and externality taxes are strategic complements, deviation
in both policies simultaneously grants the deviator less benefit than the sum of the gains
in each policy independently. Similarly, gains from cooperation in both policies are

45

greater than the sum of the gain from cooperation in each policy. Therefore, linkage
incentive constraint holds with a slack when evaluated in a no-linkage solution. These
conditions are satisfied when the externality has cross-border effect and is sufficiently
weighted in contrast to import competing lobbies. I extend this literature by providing an
analysis of linkage under limited punishments, where conditions imposed by the WTO
are adopted. The credible conditioning of punishments on the magnitude of deviation
from a cooperation path allows us to characterize the equilibria with partial cooperation
as a punishment. Therefore, I have more than one incentive constraint under the linkage
regime as opposed to the previous works in the literature, which enables me to show that
linkage might actually reduce the cooperation when punishments are limited and home
and foreign country policy variables are strategic substitutes, which is not possible under
the framework of previous papers.
Chisik (2009) investigated linking symmetric issues when parties observe
partner’s trade policy with a noise, which can generate trade disputes. The paper shows
that when the noise is perfectly correlated across independent issues, there is no reason
not to link the agreements. However, linkage provides less cooperation as the degree of
correlation decreases. Similarly, Ederington (2002) also uses information asymmetry to
question the benefits of linking trade and environmental agreements. With no crossborder effects, he finds that linking might be detrimental when countries incorrectly
observe cheating, and might be beneficial when they fail to detect cheating. Matsushima
(2001) provides the efficiency conditions under multimarket contact when firms cannot
perfectly observe their competitor's choice. My results do not depend on asymmetric
information. Characterization of the agreements in this paper is derived from previous
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works by Bagwell and Staiger (1999), Chisik and Davies (2004), and Zissimos (2007).
Bagwell and Staiger develop the intuition for trade agreements as mechanisms that
induce the countries to internalize the Terms of Trade effect of import tariffs. I use the
self-enforceability assumption throughout the present paper. Chisik and Davies provide
the framework of tax treaties as the cooperative solution for inefficiently high unilateral
taxation. However, I do not employ the structure of irreversibility in capacity
installations, which Chisik and Davies use to explain gradualism in tax treaties. Hence,
my model does not incorporate dynamic adjustments in trade agreements. Finally,
Zissimos elaborates how limited punishment affects cooperative behavior under strategic
substitutability between policy variables. He does not consider multimarket interaction
between the countries. I extend his work by introducing the cross-retaliation option.
Blanchard (2007) explicitly recognizes the effect of export platform FDI on unilateral
tariff liberalization. However, she does not consider tax on FDI a policy variable, hence
there is only a single cooperation problem.
The next section of this paper elaborates the economic environment by defining
the production and consumption structure of goods, determinants of capital flows, and
behavior of governments under a no cooperation scenario. I then introduce establishment
of free trade agreement and tax treaty under the assumption of independent issues, and
investigate the effects of linkage under symmetric and asymmetric cases. The third
section focuses on linkage when trade and tax issues are correlated. I provide two cases in
subsections, export-biased and import-biased technological spillovers. The fourth section
studies linkage under limited punishments. Last section discusses policy implications of
my results.
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II.II. THE MODEL
Economic Environment
There are three countries in the model: Home, Foreign and Rest of the World
(ROW). The home (foreign) country is populated with

identical agents. Each agent

units of capital. Labor is assumed to be

is endowed with one unit of labor and

immobile, whereas capital is mobile between Home and Foreign countries.
Demand Side:
There are two independent goods,

and , and a numeraire good, , consumed by

Home and Foreign consumers. There are also two goods consumed by only ROW
consumers besides the numeraire, which do not require separate notations in this paper
because they do not affect my results. Preferences of agents in Home and Foreign are
represented by quasi-linear utility functions,

, for

. Sub-utility functions are assumed to be quadratic so that demand for a nonnumeraire good is only a decreasing function of its own price,
for

and

.

Supply Side:
The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale (CRS)
technology, using one unit of labor per unit of output. I assume that the supply of labor is
high enough to guarantee the production of the numeraire. Therefore, both the numeraire
good and labor have price of unity in equilibrium. Good

and good , on the other hand,

are produced in both countries subject to different quadratic cost functions,
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and

, with increasing marginal costs,

. I assume that home country

producers have lower marginal costs in good

at each level of production,

, and foreign producers have lower marginal costs in good
, so that home country exports good

,

and imports good .

Capital is invested either in the home country or in the foreign country to produce
independent goods, which are traded freely with ROW at prices of unity. Denoting the
amount of home capital invested in the foreign country by , gross return for the home
investors becomes

. Home and foreign production functions are

increasing and concave in capital,
satisfy

Inada

and

, and they also

conditions,

and
.

Governments:
Governments maximize indirect utilities of corresponding representative agents
using specific import tariffs,

, and corporate income taxes on repatriated profits of
. This maximization problem can be

incoming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
written

in

two

stages

when

trade

and

FDI

issues

are

not

correlated:

Tax and tariff revenues are
redistributed to consumers in lump sum.
Market Equilibrium:
Home and foreign market prices are given by

and

in

the absence of segmentation between the markets. Producers maximize their profits given
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market prices:

for

. The first order conditions for

these maximization problems are shown as:

Consumers maximize their utility subject to budget constraints given market
prices:

, where income is given
. The

by
first order condition for the consumer maximization problem is, then:

for non-numeraire goods. Demand for the numeraire good, on the other hand, is equal to
the portion of income not spent on goods

or . Equilibrium prices of non-numeraire

goods are given by market clearing conditions,

.

Therefore, I can write the social welfare generated by the trade component of indirect
utility as follows:

Unilaterally optimal tariffs maximize this component of social welfare:
. Defining the variables within the proximity of equilibrium
values, I can use the Envelope Theorem to characterize the first order condition for this
maximization problem. Employing the first order conditions for producers (
for consumers (

), this becomes:
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) and

with the solution

. It is straightforward to show that home welfare decreases

with foreign tariff, and increases with own tariff for values lower than the Nash level,
. However, the joint welfare effect of a tariff is negative,

;

hence, joint efficiency is achieved in free trade, i.e. when governments apply zero tariffs.
Therefore, there is scope for a free trade agreement.
Now I will analyze the equilibrium behavior in the investment market. Given the
tax rates, investors maximize their return by optimally allocating the capital between
countries,

, with the following first order condition:

The equilibrium Foreign Direct Investment, , decreases in the host country tax rate,

.

To show this, I differentiate the first order condition (2-4) with respect to tax rate,

since

,

and

. Governments maximize the

investment related component of social welfare by choosing optimal taxes,
where

,

. The first order condition for

this maximization problem becomes:
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Solving for

and remembering that investment decreases in tax rate, I can see

that the unilaterally optimal tax rate is positive,

. However, unilaterally

optimal taxes are not jointly efficient. I differentiate the sum of welfares on investment
with respect to tax rate to show this:

since

within proximity of the equilibrium by the first order

condition (2-4). It is straightforward to show that the jointly efficient tax rate is zero in a
symmetric case. Therefore, unilaterally optimal taxes are inefficiently high and there is
scope for a tax treaty. I will characterize the agreements in trade and investment in next
section.
Cooperation under Independent Trade and Investment
Governments face two distinct cooperation problems when the policy variables in
trade and in investment are not structurally correlated. I will keep this assumption for
now to characterize the agreements separately, analyze the effects of linking under that
framework and will remove it in the next section to analyze cooperative behavior under
correlated policy issues. I assume commitment in both policy arguments, where
governments simultaneously announce value of the policy variables first, then producers
and investors undertake production and investment actions, then governments apply the
announced tariffs and markets clear, and finally investors in partner countries repatriate
the profits less the announced taxes 18 .

18

This assumption enables us abstract from unnecessary complexities that would arise had the governments
have the option of informing domestic agents about a planned betrayal. Our results do not depend on this
assumption qualitatively.
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Free Trade Agreement
I characterized unilaterally optimal import policies in the previous section. Now, I
elaborate the structure of cooperation under a free trade agreement. An agreement, in this
case, specifies a cooperative tariff rate to be applied by both governments unless one of
the parties deviate. Governments apply Nash tariffs forever following any deviation. The
payoff structure constitutes a Prisoner's Dilemma type interaction; cooperation is jointly
beneficial, however each government has an incentive to betray the agreement, which
establishes the non-cooperative actions as the only Nash Equilibrium outcome in a oneshot game. In a dynamic framework, where the same stage game is played infinitely,
governments need to compare their one-shot gains from deviation with the discounted
sum of welfare gains they give up in the continuation game by betraying. In the absence
of an external enforcing mechanism, the cooperative tariff rate needs to be incentive
compatible, i.e., one-shot gains from betrayal need to be lower than the discounted sum
of welfare gains from cooperation. I can write the incentive constraint for the home
government as follows:

where the left hand side denotes the welfare gain from deviation in tariff policy,
; and the right hand side is the discounted sum
of future costs from deviation in tariffs,
Superscripts

denote the deviation values,

.
and

denote cooperation and Nash values

respectively. For a given discount rate, , I will call the minimum tariff rate that satisfies
this incentive constraint with equality the most cooperative tariff, and will denote it with
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. Home and foreign values of corresponding tariff rates and payoffs are identical in a
symmetric case.

Figure 3. Incentive Compatibility in Free Trade Agreement
Tax Treaty
A tax treaty specifies a cooperative tax rate to be applied by both governments as
long as no deviation is observed. Governments apply unilaterally optimal tax rates
forever following a betrayal. The payoff structure constitutes a Prisoner's Dilemma game,
and governments cooperate in the absence of an external enforcement mechanism as in
free trade agreement. The incentive constraint of the home government is defined as:

where the notation is defined such that it is analogous to free trade agreement case,
; and

.I

will call the minimum tax rate that satisfies this incentive constraint with equality, for a
given discount rate

, the most cooperative tax rate and denote it with
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.

A no-linkage regime is characterized by these two separate agreements, where
governments cooperate policy-by-policy and cross-retaliation is not allowed. Therefore,
punishment is constrained within the policy issue where betrayal is observed. This
provides the governments with the ability to cooperate partially. I will analyze the
welfare effects of linking the two agreements in a symmetric case in the next section.
Linkage in a Symmetric Case
I consider a symmetric case, where populations and capital endowments are
identical, preferences and cost functions are mirror images between home and foreign
.

countries:

The

home's export (import) sector is analogous to the foreign country’s export (import)
sector; therefore, optimal taxes and tariffs are identical between governments under
cooperation, betrayal and Nash reversion. A linkage regime is defined with the ability of
governments to punish the deviating party by playing Nash reversion in both policy
arguments. Hence, when a government betrays an agreement it prefers doing so both in
taxes and in tariffs simultaneously. Therefore, there is only one incentive constraint for
each government in this case:

The left hand side of the inequality denotes the gain from deviation in both
,

policies,

where

represents

aggregate welfare which can be written in two stages when the trade and investment
components are uncorrelated, i.e.

. The

right hand side the inequality is the discounted sum of future gains from cooperation in
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both policies,

. This

notation allows us to see the changes in incentive compatibility easily.
The effect of linking the agreements can be studied in several cases depending on
how the unlinked incentive constraints given in equations (2-6) and (2-7) are structured
compared to global optimum. Obviously, when both constraints are slack at global
optimum, i.e., incentive constraints do not bind when

and

, then linkage

does not alter incentive compatibility or welfares. However, when one constraint is slack
and the other one is binding at corresponding global optimum values, then linkage
transfers some enforcement power from the slack one to the binding one. To see this,
assume that

and there is slackness in (2-6) at this global optimum, whereas

and (2-7) binds at this value:

Now, subtract

from both sides in linkage incentive

constraint to get:

where

.

I

observe slackness in tax treaty for a given most cooperative tax now because the right
hand side is greater in linkage regime since

by (2-9). Therefore, governments can

enhance the cooperation by further reducing the cooperative tax rate under linkage.
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Intuitively, linking the free trade agreement with the tax treaty improves cooperation in
the latter one since the former agreement brings less benefit from deviation than cost of
it.
Linkage in an Asymmetric Case:
I relax my symmetry assumption in this section. I characterize effects of size
differences on incentive compatibility of separate agreements, and elaborate how linkage
help governments overcome the obstacles for further cooperation. The idea is that when a
small country interacts with a large country, the large country has less incentive to reduce
its tariffs compared to the small one, because the small country has a greater degree of
export dependency. On the other hand, if the size of market in the large country is also
associated with the amount of capital stock, then the large country becomes more
investment dependent than the small one. The small country has less incentive to reduce
the taxes in this case. Therefore, linking the agreements generate further cooperation in
both issues, when the “short” sides switch between the issues.
Assume that the agents are still identical in tastes and endowments of capital,
however the home country has a greater population,

. Therefore, demands for both

goods are higher in the home country for a given per-capita income, and home country
has a greater capital stock,

. The following proposition provides the results

regarding the changes in incentive compatibility for trade agreement and tax treaty
stemming from this asymmetry in size and capital stock.
Proposition 1. Given identical preferences of agents, endowments of capital per-person,
discount rates and mirror image costs of production; if
observed in a no-linkage regime:
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, then the following are

(a) Home country has a higher most cooperative tariff,
(b) Foreign country has a higher most cooperative tax,
(c) Linkage improves cooperation both in trade policy and in investment policy.
When governments apply identical tariffs and taxes in cooperation, the most
cooperative tariff will be determined by home country's incentive constraint, and the most
cooperative tax rate will be determined by the foreign country's incentive constraint.
Therefore, each country's incentive constraint binds in one agreement and slacks in the
other. Since the enforcement is transferred in opposite directions, linkage improves
cooperation in both agreements by my argument in the previous section.
II.III. INTERCONNECTED TRADE AND INVESTMENT
I relax the assumption of independence between trade and FDI in this section.
However, the assumption of symmetry between countries holds in order to isolate the
effect of correlation between investment and trade. I analyze two different cases on the
basis of the structure of interdependence to elaborate two non-results, where linkage does
not provide any further enforcement power. The first case is characterized by a
technological spillover effect of inbound FDI in host country's export sector. The idea
here is that when FDI reduces the cost of production in the export sector of the host
country, then lowering the taxes on FDI creates further trade besides increasing the
investment. The second case is characterized by a FDI technological spillover effect in
host country's import competing sector. Lowering the taxes, in this case, inhibits trade
since the cost-gap between domestic and foreign producers are narrowed down by further
investment, leading to a partial shift from imports to domestic production.
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To illustrate my results I first need to introduce the necessary analytical tools. I
start with submodularity condition. Since the welfares are assumed to be continuously
differentiable, I can define this as follows:
Definition. (Topkis, 1998) A real valued function

is supermodular in

, if the following holds

for all

. It is strictly supermodular if the inequality is strict. It is (strictly)

submodular if

is (strictly) supermodular.

For continuously differentiable functions, supermodularity condition reduces to a
strategic complementarity requirement, i.e.,

in case of welfare function.

Similarly, the submodularity condition is equivalent to the strategic substitutability
requirement,

. Intuitively, when the objective function (welfare) is submodular

in two arguments (when taxes and tariffs are strategic substitutes), then the marginal
effect of an argument (tax) decreases in the other argument (tariff). On the other hand,
when the objective function is supermodular in two arguments (strategic complements),
then the marginal effect of one argument increases in the other one.

Lemma 1. If the welfare function is submodular in own policy arguments and strictly
submodular in partner's policy arguments, then linkage provides additional enforcement
power.
When domestic policy variables are strategic substitutes, so that the welfare
function is submodular in the variables, gains from simultaneous deviation in both
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policies is less than the sum of gains from deviation in each policy independently.
Similarly, if the welfare is strictly submodular in the partner's policy choices, then gain
from simultaneous cooperation in both policies is greater than the sum of gains from
cooperation in each policy independently. Therefore, the single incentive constraint in the
linked agreement holds with a slack when defined at the most cooperative levels of nolinkage regime.
Export Biased Technological Spillover
I now introduce a case where incoming FDI has technological spillovers in the
host country's export good. Specifically, the cost of producing good

( ) decreases at a

decreasing rate in home (foreign) country as the level of FDI inflow increases. Formally,
, with the following properties:

,

,

and

.

However, this spillover is a pure externality, therefore it does not appear in the investors'
maximization problem,

, where FDI is a decreasing function of the tax rate. I

assume that domestic capital stock does not have any effect on cost of production in any
country. This structure prevents us from writing welfares with two separate components,
i.e., trade and investment related items. However, I can write it as:

The key to this characterization is that welfare on the home's export (import)
sector is a function of home's tax rate (tariff) and foreign's tariff (tax rate). This relation
implies that the optimal policy in a certain issue is not a function of the policy variable in
other issue. I can show this strategic independence as follows:
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Intuitively, this independence shows that the marginal change in home's welfare due to a
small change in a certain policy variable is independent from of other policy variables.
Therefore, simultaneous increases in both policy variables have the same effect on
aggregate welfare as the sum of the effects, had the increase in policy variables occur
independently. I now provide my main result for export biased technological spillover
case.
Proposition 2. Import tariffs and FDI taxes are neither strategic complements nor
strategic substitutes in export biased technological spillover case. Therefore, linking the
Free Trade Agreement and Tax Treaty does not generate further enforcement power.
Intuitively, technological spillover alters the structure of cooperation in both Free
Trade Agreement and Tax Treaty since consequences of actions in a specific policy is no
longer contained in the corresponding agreement. A deviation in tax policy changes FDI
inflow, reducing the welfare on export good by increasing the cost of production.
However, there is no strategic correlation between taxes on FDI and domestic tariffs
since the former does not have a spillover effect in import competing sector. Therefore,
gain from simultaneous deviations in both arguments is equal to the sum of gains from
deviation in each policy independently. The same intuition applies for strategic
independence of the partner's policy variables in domestic welfare.
Technological Spillover in Import Competing Sector
This section introduces a case where foreign direct investment reduces the cost of
production at a decreasing rate in the import competing sector of the host country. For the
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home country this effect can be shown as
and

, where

,

,

. This spillover is an externality that is not internalized by investors

as in the export biased case. Welfare function is not separable in policy arguments, but
can be written in trade and investment related components:

where welfare on the export sector is only a function of the partner's policy variables and
welfare on import competing sector is a function of only domestic policy variables, as
opposed to the export biased spillover case. I now elaborate the strategic
complementarity between tax and tariff rates when there is spillover in import competing
sector. Formally,

where the first negative sign on the right hand side of the equation shows that domestic
producers produce less of the import competing good when the tax rate on FDI is
increased. This is because of the fact that foreign investors invest less in the host country
as a response to tax hikes, which reduces the amount of cost-reduction in the import
competing sector of host country. The second negative sign reflects the fact that the
change in demand because of altering equilibrium price is a second order effect, whereas
the domestic supply changes as a first order response to altering costs. The first and
second arguments together elaborate the change in import demand when the tax rate is
increased slightly. The idea here is that as the tax rate on repatriated FDI profits is
increased, foreign investors undertake less investment in the host country, which
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increases the cost of production in the import competing sector of the host country.
Therefore, the first order effect will be a decrease in domestic production of the import
good. This reduction generates secondary effects through an increase in equilibrium
market price such as decreasing demand in the domestic economy. Import demand,
however, increases since the reduction in domestic production dominates the decrease in
domestic demand. The welfare function is also supermodular in the partner's policy
variables. The strategic complementarity between foreign tax and tariffs can be expressed
as:

I now introduce my main result for the case with spillover in import competing sector.
Proposition 3. Import tariffs and FDI taxes are strategic complements in a case with
FDI-led technological spillovers in import competing sector. Therefore, linking the Free
Trade Agreement with the Tax Treaty does not generate further enforcement power.
When tariffs and taxes are strategic complements, so that the welfare function is
(strictly) supermodular in own policy variables, gain from deviation in a certain policy
increases in the other policy variable. Therefore, a simultaneous deviation in both policies
brings a greater welfare gain than sum of the gains from deviation in each argument.
Similarly, when the welfare function is (strictly) supermodular in partner's policy
variables gain from simultaneous cooperation in both policies is less than the sum of the
gains from cooperation in each policy separately. As a result, the single incentive
constraint under linkage regime does not generate any slackness when evaluated at the
most cooperative values of no-linkage regime.
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II.IV. LINKAGE UNDER LIMITED PUNISHMENTS
This section drops the Nash reversion structure I used in the previous sections and
introduces an analysis of cooperation under limited punishments. Consider a case where
trade and investment are not related and countries are symmetric. A stage game has
characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma in each agreement under no-linkage regime. An
important aspect of this type of interaction is the identity of the stage game Nash play and
minmax strategies. Therefore, punishment under Grim-Trigger strategies also provides
reservation utilities for both players. Linking under the Nash reversion assumption
preserves this structure, i.e., any deviation is punished at the greatest scale so that both
players get reservation utilities in both issues. However, this is a “compression” that
dismisses some interesting cooperative equilibria that arise since linking the issue
provides “milder” punishment options. In this section I interpret linkage as allowing
cross-retaliation rather than punishing any deviation at greatest scale in both issues. I
show that when governments are bounded with Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions
(WEC) rule, they prefer lower deviation values in each policy variable than the Nash
reversion case. Moreover, when the two agreements are linked, these optimal deviation
values become even smaller if the home and foreign tariffs (taxes) are strategic
substitutes. However, I use these results to show that linking the agreements under
limited punishment actually reduces the cooperation between governments when: 1.
Home tariffs (taxes) and foreign tariffs (taxes) are strategic substitutes, 2. The WEC rule
is applied only when a deviation is non-abusive (deviation in a single policy), whereas an
abusive deviation (deviation in both issues) is punished by the Nash Reversion.
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To elaborate my results, I make the following assumptions in regards to welfare
functions:
Assumption 1.
i.) Welfare functions are concave and increasing in own tariffs
with
tariff,

,

, and convex and decreasing in partner's

and

ii.) Domestic tariff and partner's tariff are strategic substitutes,
and

iii.) Free trade is the global optimum,

Governments face an additional problem, besides the choice of deviation or
cooperation, when punishments are limited. A deviating government needs to optimize
the level of deviation in order to maximize the sum of one time gain from deviation and
infinite stream of punishment payoffs, which is a function of deviation level. I can write
this two-step maximization problem as follows:

where superscript

and subscript

denote punishment and no-linkage respectively.

This formulation tells me that at a given point in time, each government compares the
payoff from cooperative action with the maximum payoff that can be generated by
adjusting the deviation tariff accordingly. The optimal deviation tariff for a given
cooperative tariff

maximizes the sum of one-shot deviation payoff and discounted sum

of punishment stage payoffs, formally:
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with the following first order condition:

The following lemma shows that the deviation tariff that solves this problem is smaller
than the one under Nash reversion strategies.
Lemma 2. (Limited deviation under limited punishment)
i.) Optimal deviation tariff under limited punishments is smaller than the one under the
Nash reversion case for every level of cooperative tariff when tariffs are strategic
substitutes in deviating country welfare.
ii.) Optimal deviation tariff decreases in the cooperative tariff and discount factor:
<0,

<0.

First part of this lemma arises from the following observation: when punishments
are set at maximum level regardless of the deviation, the best a deviating government can
do is to maximize its payoff in the stage game without any consideration of future
payoffs. On the other hand, this static solution is no longer optimal when punishments are
conditioned on deviation. A dynamic solution trickles the deviation tariff down under
limited punishment. The proof of this lemma shows that both tariffs, the ones under
limited punishment and Nash reversion strategies, are decreasing in the agreed
cooperative tariff

because of strategic substitutability between home and foreign

tariffs. However, the deviation tariff under limited punishment is below the other one for
every level of

. The second inequality reflects the fact that as the weight of future flow
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increases in overall payoff, governments prefer a smaller deviation tariff to reduce the
future impact of punishment.
Given a discount factor, the most cooperative tariff is defined as the agreed tariff
rate that equalizes the maximum payoff under deviation with the payoff under
cooperation. Formally,

Figure 2 shows the optimal deviation tariffs under Nash Reversion and limited
punishment for given levels of cooperative tariffs. The following lemma claims the
existence of most cooperative tariff as the lowest tariff that induces no deviation at all.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique most cooperative tariff under limited punishment.
Moreover,

for

.

Figure 4. Optimal Deviation Tariff: Nash Reversion and Limited Punishment
I now investigate the change in deviation tariff when cross-retaliation is allowed.
Specifically, each government is allowed to deviate in different agreements by the
magnitude of initial deviation after a betrayal is observed, i.e., the deviator (the home
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country in this case) receives a stage game payoff
(foreign) receives

and the respondent

forever. The independence assumption enables

me write the overall welfare function in trade and investment components separately. I
will assume that the welfares on trade and tax components are generated by identical
functions for simplicity, i.e.,

. Therefore, I can write the two stage decision

making problem under linkage as follows,

The first order condition for optimization problem in deviation is:

A marginal increase in deviation tariff has three effects in both no-linkage and
linkage regimes: First, it increases the payoff in deviation period by assumption

.

Second, it increases the payoff in punishment phase by the same assumption, holding the
partner's tariff constant. Third, it decreases the payoff in punishment phase since the
partner retaliates by an equal magnitude. The third effect dominates the second effect by
assumption

, therefore the overall welfare effect of a marginal increase in deviation

tariff is negative in the punishment phase. The major difference in optimal deviation
between no-linkage and linkage regimes arises in the second and third effects. Both the
second and third affects are greater under linkage than no-linkage. Therefore, the
reduction in punishment phase payoff because of a marginal increase in deviation tariff is
greater under the no-linkage regime. The following proposition shows that governments
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apply a greater deviation tariff under linkage because of lower marginal impact of
deviation on payoffs in the punishment phase.
Proposition 4. (Main Result) Suppose Home and Foreign tariffs (taxes) are strategic
substitutes and Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions rule is applied in disputes, then
(a) Optimal deviation tariff under linkage is greater than the one under no linkage for
every level of cooperative tariff,

,

(b) Most cooperative tariff under linkage is greater than the one under no-linkage,
, therefore linkage reduces enforcement under limited punishments.

Figure 5. Optimal Deviation under Linkage and Limited Punishment Rule
Intuitively, the limited punishment rule tailors the punishment for the “crime.”
This “mild” punishment option is preferred by both governments since both get higher
payoffs than their reservation utilities entailed by the Nash Reversion. However, linkage
provides additional reduction in the magnitude of punishment even though it is still
determined by initial deviation. This reduction enables governments to increase the
deviation tariff under linkage. Therefore, whereas a “milder” punishment phase promotes
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further cooperation between the governments when the transition is from Nash Reversion
to Limited Punishment under the no-linkage regime, it reduces the cooperation when the
transition is from a no-linkage regime to a linkage regime under the limited punishment
rule. Figure 5 illustrates the change in deviation tariff under linkage. Given any
cooperative tariff, the linkage deviation tariff is positioned in between the deviation
tariffs under the Nash Reversion and no-linkage with limited punishment cases. The
following lemma shows that cross-retaliation structure under linkage is incentive
compatible for both players.
Lemma 4. Limited punishment path under linkage is subgame perfect.
The proof of this lemma states that once a deviation occurs neither party has an
incentive to deviate from the punishment path, i.e., the initial deviator cooperates in its
punishment and the punisher does not violate the limited punishment rule. The range of
discount rate values that are incentive compatible in cooperative phase also support
partial cooperation during the punishment phase.

II.V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper helps analyze one of the most controversial issues in international
cooperation. Increasing level of tension between interconnected economic environment
(trade and FDI) and fragmented legal framework (separate trade agreements and tax
treaties) boosted the scholars and policy makers seek alternatives to the current system.
The WTO, being successful in eliminating barriers against trade, has gained special
attention as a possible resort where the fragmented international legal framework could
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be reconciled. I examined the feasibility of linking Free Trade Agreements and Tax
Treaties under different economic environments and punishment schemes.
I show that linking the agreements can improve joint welfare by reallocating the
scarce enforcement power between the issues, when issues are not related and
asymmetric and countries are symmetric. This result is analogous to the one provided by
Bernheim & Whinston (1990) for multimarket interaction between firms. Linkage proves
more useful when countries are asymmetric. I analyze a case where a large (developed)
country interacts with a small (developing) country. The former has little incentive to
reduce tariffs and more incentives to reduce taxes bilaterally, whereas the latter has more
incentives to reduce tariffs and little incentives to reduce taxes. Thus, linking the
agreements allows a government to undertake favors in one agreement, where it is the
“short” side of cooperation, in return for reciprocal favors from the partner in the other
agreement. Therefore, linkage improves joint welfare by increasing the level of
cooperation in both issues in this case. This result is quite relevant since it shows that
linkage might enable a small country get further market access in a large country, and it
enables the large country to “secure” its investment in the small one.
I then relaxed my assumption of independent trade and investment by introducing
technological spillovers in export sector and import competing sector in the host country.
Specifically, I consider cases where FDI inflow has positive efficiency effects in those
sectors, i.e., cost of producing domestic goods decreases in investment level. My analysis
shows that even though the welfares on trade and investment issues are interconnected in
export-biased technological spillover case, the policy variables are not. This
independence reflects the fact that investment in the host country does not affect the
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marginal returns on tariffs; in other words they are strategically unrelated. Tariffs and
taxes become strategic complements when FDI affects the import competing sector.
Obviously, this might imply a case where FDI inflow in a developing country helps
domestic producers become more efficient in import goods from a developed country.
However, we report that linking the agreements does not help increase the cooperation in
this case.
A significant practical concern for reconciliation of trade and investment regimes
is the institutional structure of linkage. Other works in the linkage literature use
maximum punishment rule to address enforcement issues. However, I emphasize the fact
that current international institutions limit the punishments on the basis of continuing
legal relationship principle. To analyze the linkage under WTO framework, I impose
Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions rule. I show that, even though limited punishment
rule allows further cooperation between governments, linking the agreements under
limited punishment rule does not do so when own and partner's policy variables are
strategic substitutes. In a partial equilibrium framework, the substitutability condition in
trade policy might reflect a case where the imported good is an input for the export good.
Therefore, the present paper extends the literature by introducing the consequences of
linkage under interaction between own and partner's policy variables, besides applying
limited punishments.
An acknowledged shortcoming of this paper is the exclusion of multiple country
interactions. I believe that allowing for strategic relationships among FDI host countries,
especially competition for FDI, would provide interesting results. An interesting future
research project could provide an explanation for bilateral nature of Tax treaties, as
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opposed to multilateral free trade agreements. That would develop a key analytical
framework for reconciliation of the two regimes.
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III. RECONCILIATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
REGIMES AND GATT ARTICLE XXVIII

III.I. INTRODUCTION
Last two decades have witnessed great strides in trade and environmental policy
debates. On the one hand, successful trade liberalizations under GATT negotiations have
convinced environmental groups to push for a unified international regime in trade and
environment. This unification entails a set of minimum environmental standards for
GATT signatories and access to dispute resolution mechanisms under the WTO for
environmental disputes. On the other hand, the risk of losing hard-earned gains in trade
liberalization instigates many trade economists to be suspicious of this idea. A primary
concern is that enforcing international cooperation in environmental issues would be
undertaken at the expense of liberalized international trading system. I concur with this
concern on the basis of an institutional design perspective. This paper shows that the
rules designed for implementing further trade liberalization under the GATT system
might hinder a beneficial reconciliation of trade and environment regimes under the
current institutional structure.
In compliance with the principle of continuing the legal relationships among
governments in International Law, GATT Article XXVIII limits the applicable retaliation
by a complainant in a trade related dispute. Specifically, under the Withdrawal of
Equivalent Concessions (WEC) Rule, retaliation is bounded with the magnitude of initial
nullification or impairment. Considered in international trade framework, this rule might
enable further cooperation among governments. The idea here is that WEC Rule
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facilitates further cooperation in a trade agreement when tariffs are strategic substitutes,
because governments limit initial deviations to avoid provoking aggressive punishments.
However, this is not true for linked agreements when evaluated in association with
Article 22.3 of Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which determines the
conditions where cross-retaliation is allowed. When cross-retaliation is allowed,
retaliating governments prefer utilizing it to avoid lower payoffs during the punishment
phase. However, this also reduces the magnitude of punishment when policy variables are
strategic substitutes, therefore enhancing the incentives to betray the agreement. Hence,
this paper raises an objection to incorporation of environmental issues to the existing
institutional framework in international trade. I remain silent for other types of
reconciliations.
In order to focus on institutional aspects of linking the agreements, I characterize
an environment where international trade has negligible environmental effects. This
environment is elaborated by a standard two country three good trade model where the
non-tradable sector generates all the trans-boundary pollution. In the absence of an
environmental agreement, governments apply unilaterally optimal pollution taxes in the
non-tradable sector to trickle down the domestic effects of the pollution and compensate
for consumer disutility from environmental externalities. However, the non-cooperative
equilibrium is characterized by insufficient taxation as compared to the global optimum;
therefore there is scope for an international agreement. A self-enforcing environmental
agreement specifies a cooperative level of taxation, and cooperation is sustained under
the threat of future retaliation in a repeated interaction. Limit to the cooperation is
determined by government's discounting for the future stream of payoffs. As opposed to
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the environmental case, a non-cooperative equilibrium in trade is characterized by
excessive tariffs on imported goods. Terms of trade externality is the trans-boundary
effect that generates the inefficiency of unilateral policies in trade. Governments establish
a trade agreement to reduce tariffs on a reciprocal basis. However, I mimic the
institutional structure of WTO and assume that a betrayal in the trade agreement is
punished according to the WEC rule. To complete the structure of my model, I impose
strategic substitutability condition in tariffs by assuming that exported and imported
goods are substitute goods in consumption. This assumption is shown to be sufficient to
ensure the existence of strategic substitutability in tariffs if the demand functions are
separable in prices. I show that limited punishment rule induces a betraying government
to apply a limited deviation.
I then analyze the implications of linking the trade and environmental agreements.
Specifically, I focus on the alteration in enforcement when WEC rule is applied and
cross-retaliation is allowed. Under a linked regime, failure to comply with conditions
specified by an agreement can trigger retaliation in the other one. I then show that
allowing cross-retaliation increases the deviation tariff and decreases cooperation when
tariffs are strategic substitutes under WEC rule. The idea here is that, when a country can
retaliate in environmental standards when its partner betrays in import tariffs, then it will
prefer to do so. This preference arises because retaliation in the trade agreement, where
the betraying government already raised its tariffs, hurts the punisher more than crossretaliation because of the strategic substitutability of tariffs. However, a cross-retaliation
also reduces the magnitude of punishment for initial betrayer for the same reason,
reducing the set of incentive compatible cooperative tariffs.
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My results and methodology correlate to several areas in the literature.
Environmental consequences of trade policy have been investigated thoroughly in trade
and environmental policy literature. The main idea here is that once governments sign
trade agreements, hence become unable to use tariffs to provide protection for domestic
producers, they are prompted to lower environmental standards to gain competitive edge.
Copeland (1990), Barrett (1994) and Ederington and Minier (2003) elaborate this “race to
the bottom” concern. Ederington (2001) investigates optimal policy making when
environmental policy affects welfare only through terms-of-trade externality. His paper
shows that governments cooperate in trade policy initially and then relax the cooperation
in environmental policy if enforceable. When there is no across-the-border pollution,
trade policy has first order effects on terms of trade, whereas the environmental policy
has second order effects through cost of production implications. However, these studies
do not consider the structure of cooperation in trade and environment issues.
Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2008) investigates optimal cooperation where
governments have access to several domestic policy variables besides the trade policy.
However, contracting on domestic policy issues is costly because of imperfect
observability. Therefore, issues with relatively higher contracting costs and lower
manipulation capacity in trading equilibrium will be negotiated at a later stage. However,
as in Ederington (2001), Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2008) reduce the trans-boundary
effects of domestic policies to the terms of trade effect only. In contrast, Limão (2005)
investigates the enforcement implications of linking domestic policy and trade issues by
allowing traded goods to generate cross-border production externalities. When tariffs and
pollution taxes are strategic complements, a simultaneous deviation in both policies
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grants the deviator less benefit than the sum of individual benefits from deviating in each
policy independently. Similarly, gain from cooperation in both policies is greater than the
sum of the gain from cooperation in each policy. Therefore, the incentive constraint holds
with slackness under linkage, when evaluated at non-linkage levels of policy variables.
As opposed to previous work, my paper focuses on the institutional design of linking
trade and environmental policies. I allow two channels of cross-boundary externalities,
pollution and terms-of-trade effect. However, my result holds when pollution has
negligible terms of trade externality implications and when international trade has
negligible pollution effects.
I paper also relates to a linkage literature on a game theoretic level. Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) show that firms act more cooperatively when they interact in several
markets and there is sufficient asymmetry between the markets or firms. The increase in
cooperation arises from reallocation of enforcement power through reciprocal exchange
of concessions. Spagnolo (1999a) extends the previous work by introducing interaction
among the markets via concave firm objective functions. The concavity generates scale
economies and provides further collusion by decreasing the incentives to act selfishly in
both issues. Chisik (2009) introduces a different environment where correlation of
asymmetric information between the issues replaces the structural interaction between
them. The paper shows that when the noise is perfectly correlated between different
issues, then linkage does not provide any further enforcement benefits. However, linkage
will reduce cooperation as degree of correlation decreases by generating more disputes.
Ederington (2002) also finds that linking might be detrimental when countries incorrectly
detect cheating. A primary methodological difference of my approach is that my results

78

do not depend on structural interaction between the issues. I focus on the implications of
equilibrium strategies players employ and show that institutional rules, i.e., limited
punishment rule, might have an effect on equilibrium outcome in this context.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two elaborates a trade and environment
model and analyzes the behavior of key agents, i.e., consumers, producers and
governments, in the equilibrium. The next section investigates the opportunities for
cooperation between governments where the international regimes for trade and
environment policies are separated. I then establish a unified international regime for
trade and environment under GATT Rule XXVIII and elaborate my main result. The last
section concludes.

III.II. A TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT MODEL
I consider a partial equilibrium set up. There are two countries, Home and
and . The following structure is

Foreign, producing and consuming four goods,
imposed:

is Home's natural export good,

is Home's natural import good,

is non-

tradable and

is the numeraire. Preferences of consumers which satisfy this structure are

given

the

by

following

quasi-linear

form

of

the

, where
consumption of good . Sub-utility functions

and

utility

function,

denotes the

are increasing in their

arguments and the former one is assumed to be quadratic. The last term in the utility
function denotes the disutility to consumers from pollution externalities of production.
The last term,

, is assumed to be increasing in

79

and

, which denotes the

effect of a weighted sum of production in industries with pollution externalities.
Consumers

maximize

their

utilities

given

for

equilibrium

prices

and

income,

, where income is given by the sum of

wage earnings, profit share, and redistributed tax and tariff revenues. The first order
conditions for the Consumer Maximization problem (CMP) equalize marginal utility of
each good with its equilibrium price. Two-stage budgeting provides the following
demand structure:
for

, where

and

,, where

.
The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale technology and

uses a single unit of labor per output. Given a large enough supply of labor, the numeraire
is guaranteed to be produced; therefore, both the numeraire price and wages equal to one
in equilibrium. Other goods are produced under increasing marginal costs using labor
only. Cost of production is given by
production of good , for

, where superscript

denotes the

. Producers maximize corresponding profits given
. The first order

technologies and equilibrium prices,

conditions for the Producer Maximization Problem (PMP) equalize market price of a
good with the marginal cost of producing it at equilibrium level. Within this structure,
firms do not bear the environmental cost of producing polluting goods.
Governments maximize domestic welfares by imposing tariffs
goods and production taxes

on imported

on production in polluting sectors. When applicable,

tariffs generate a wedge between domestic and international prices,
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, whereas

taxes do that for consumer and producer prices,

. Therefore, my model

specifies two types of externalities. Terms of trade externality provides the governments
with the ability to generate welfare gains by affecting the international prices of their
import goods. Trans-boundary pollution, on the other hand, affects welfares because
governments do not completely bear the environmental cost of production in polluting
industries. The Following section characterizes the behavior of governments in the
absence of cooperation.

Unilateral Policy under Unrelated Issues
I assume that trade and environmental issues are not related in my benchmark
case. I represent it by the following structure,

. This structure

characterizes an environment where pollution externalities are generated only by the nontraded good. Indirect utility of a single consumer society, then, can be written as follows:

Note that under the independent issues assumption, this indirect utility function is
separable in tariffs and taxes. I show this as

, where

the former and latter terms on the right hand side of the equation denote the trade related
and environment related indirect utilities, respectively. Unilaterally optimal (Nash) tariff
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is the unique tariff that maximizes the indirect utility of the single consumer society,
given other policy variables:

where

is Home's import demand function, and numbers in

subscripts denote ordered derivatives. Each term in brackets is equal to zero according to
the Envelope Theorem and first order conditions from Consumer Maximization Problem
(CMP) and Producer Maximization Problem (PMP). Therefore the optimal tariff is given
by:

Note that under the related goods assumption, Home's import demand is a function of
foreign tariff. Therefore, unilaterally optimal tariff is also a function of the foreign
tariff 19 . The following proposition provides the sufficient conditions under which tariffs
are strategic substitutes.
Proposition 1. Home and Foreign tariffs are strategic substitutes in a partial equilibrium
environment when:
i.) Export and import goods are substitutes and normal goods
ii.) Demand function for each good is separable in prices
19

General equilibrium models have this connectivity through income effects of a price chance reflecting
applied tariffs. However, partial equilibrium models in the literature generally drop this connection for
tractability purposes. Therefore, tariffs are usually designed to be independent in partial equilibrium
environment. Our model reintroduces the interconnected optimal tariff structure in a tractable manner.
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Intuitively, when tariffs are strategic substitutes, each government has less
incentive to increase its tariff unilaterally when its exports are subject to greater tariffs in
the destination country. The idea here is that both foreign and home tariffs reduce the
relative price of the export good in the home country. In the absence of significant crosspartial effects, i.e.,

, a lower export price diminishes the effect of a tariff hike in

the home country when the goods are substitutes in consumption.
Production taxes make firms internalize a portion of pollution externalities. A
unilaterally optimal tax maximizes domestic welfare by reducing the production of
polluting good and compensating the consumers for the disutility of the pollution by
distributing the tax revenue in lump-sum:

First two terms on the right hand side are equal to zero by the Envelope Theorem,
CMP and PMP. Therefore, the optimal tax level is equal to the marginal disutility from
environmental distortion:

Unilaterally optimal tax is smaller than globally optimal level since it only
compensates for domestic disutility. The following section introduces feasible
cooperation schemes between the governments to avoid inefficient unilateral policies.
Separated International Regimes for Trade and Environment
Suppose that cooperation in trade and environment issues are negotiated
separately by governments. Cooperation in both issues are based on reciprocal exchange
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of concessions, i.e., lower tariffs and higher pollution as compared to unilaterally optimal
levels. Agreements for both issues are assumed to be self-enforcing; cooperation at a
given point in time is sustained by partner's credible threat to withdraw its concessions in
the future. Therefore, honoring a credible agreement is incentive compatible for patient
governments. This structure constitutes a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type of
interaction.
Trade Agreement
A trade agreement specifies a cooperative tariff rate

to be applied by both

governments. Governments are assumed to be bounded with the Withdrawal of
Equivalent Concessions (WEC) rule, in the spirit of GATT Article XXVIII: when a
government applies a tariff greater than the cooperative rate,
government is allowed to retaliate only by the same amount,

, the other
, in the future

periods. Therefore, following a trade agreement, incentive compatibility needs to address
two issues at a given point in time: First, each government decides the optimal level of
deviation given the cooperative tariff rate applied by the partner. Second, they decide
whether it is optimal at all to deviate from cooperation using the optimal deviation tariff.
Formally, I can write the first stage of this decision making problem as follows:

where
Superscripts

is the trade related component of social welfare and is the discount rate.
and

denote deviation, punishment and cooperation phases,

respectively; whereas the subscript

shows the variable values in the no-linkage regime.

For a given cooperative tariff level, the optimal deviation tariff maximizes the normalized
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sum of present and future payoffs under the specified punishment rule. The first order
condition for

is given by:

The first order condition states that at the optimal level of deviation tariff, a normalized
marginal gain by increasing the deviation tariff is canceled out by a reduction in the
normalized payoff during the punishment phase. The following proposition states
important comparative statics regarding the optimal deviation tariff.
Proposition 2. Suppose tariffs are strategic substitutes. Then, optimal deviation tariff
decreases in cooperative tariff rate

and discount factor

under limited

punishment rule.
The former observation is based on the strategic substitutability of tariffs. The
myopically best response tariff that unilaterally maximizes home welfare in the stage
game is smaller when the foreign government applies a greater tariff. The latter
observation, on the other hand, is simply based on the fact that an increase in the discount
factor boosts the weight of punishment phase payoffs within the normalized payoff.
Therefore, the magnitude of the punishment is perceived to be greater when governments
are more patient.
Once the optimal deviation tariff is determined as a function of the applied
cooperative tariff rate, governments compare payoffs under two different scenarios: a
“betrayal scenario”, which generates a normalized sum of one shot betrayal payoff and
infinite stream of punishment phase payoffs, and a “cooperation scenario,” which
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generates a normalized sum of cooperative payoffs. Formally, this can be shown as
follows:

A self enforcing trade agreement defined under these conditions is incentive
compatible only when governments choose the cooperation scenario in every period
given the cooperative tariff rate. Therefore, the agreement establishes the lowest
cooperative tariff rate that will induce cooperation subject to the conditions defined by
(3-5) and (3-7). I call this unique level of tariff the most cooperative tariff and formally
show it as:

One immediate result from this definition and Lemma 2 is that there exists a selfenforcing level of cooperative tariff where the optimal action is not deviating at all, i.e.,
as shown in Onder (2009).
Environmental Agreement
An environmental agreement specifies a cooperative tax rate to be applied by
governments,

. In the absence of a limited punishment rule, as opposed to trade

agreements, cooperation at a given point in time is sustained by credible threats of
applying unilaterally optimal taxes forever upon betrayal. In other words, punishment is
at a maximum level regardless of the magnitude of deviation. Therefore, any deviating
country applies unilaterally optimal tax in the deviation period when optimal taxes are
independent, i.e.

. Incentive compatibility at a given point in time can be written

as:
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The incentive constraint rules out a profitable one-shot deviation from the cooperatively
determined tax rate. The most cooperative tax rate is the maximum possible taxation that
does not violate the incentive compatibility condition:

Note that the most cooperative tax rate can be or cannot be equal to globally efficient
taxation depending on discount factor. The following section introduces the linkage
concept in trade and environment context.

III.III. RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REGIMES UNDER
GATT ARTICLE XXVIII
In this section I investigate the consequences of linking environmental and trade
agreements under the limited punishment rule in terms of its welfare and enforcement
implications. Linking the agreements enables the governments to undertake crossretaliation, i.e., betrayal in one agreement can generate a punishment phase in the other
one. I will assume that the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions rule is applicable only
when the initial deviation is not abusive 20 . Decision making in optimal deviation tariff
can be expressed as:

20

This entails Nash reversion in case of betrayal in more than one policy or non-cooperation in punishment
phase.
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where the subscript “l” denotes the variable values under linkage regime. A deviation in
tariff rate generates a stream of gains in trade related component of the welfare; however
it also generates a stream of loss in environment related component of welfare as a result
of cross retaliation by the partner. The first order condition for this optimization problem
is given by:

where the last term in brackets shows the change in punishment payoff in environment
related issue as a result of a marginal increase in deviation tariff. In this paper, I do not
explicitly specify a transition rule which maps deviation tariffs onto allowed magnitudes
of punishment in taxes 21 , i.e.

. However, I assume that

is decreasing in

.

The following proposition elaborates the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3. Suppose trade flows have negligible impact on environment. Linking the
agreements under GATT Rule XXVIII will reduce the cooperation in trade policy if the
following conditions hold:
i.)

for

, where

,

and

, so that exported

and imported goods are substitutes in consumption with small cross-partials,
ii.)

, so that distortion that results from foreign tariff is

greater than the one that results from a foreign tax.
Intuitively, this proposition suggests that there might be more incentives to betray in
tariffs in a linked agreement. A punishing government retaliates in environmental policy
since doing so generates a greater punishment phase payoff for the punisher. However,
21

This remains largely unexplored in the literature. For a brief discussion about magnitude of crossretaliation allowed under WTO rules, see Bown and Ruta (2008).
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this also implies that betrayer's punishment is also greater in the same phase due to
strategic substitutability of tariffs. Therefore, a milder future punishment generates
further incentives to betray at a given point in time.
Structure of cooperation is different in environmental issue. When linked with the
trade agreement under the limited punishment rule, there are two opposite effects
changing the enforcement of the environmental issue. The first effect is borne by
switching from Nash reversion to limited punishment rule, WEC. As opposed to the
former one, where the optimal deviation tax is equal to the myopic best response tax rate
at any point in time, the optimal deviation tax under the latter rule reflects considerations
of future punishments:

where subscript “LP” denotes the value under limited punishment rule. The first order
condition for this problem can be written as follows:

This first order condition implies a limited deviation under limited punishment.
Deviation magnitude does not alter the magnitude of punishment under Nash reversion;
therefore, governments implement the myopically optimal tax rate in deviation period.
However, when the punishment is tailored to the crime, this is no longer optimal. The
second effect arises from facilitation of cross-retaliation through linking the agreements.
Once the limited punishment rule is effective, cross-retaliation allows governments to
retaliate with tariffs by an equal amount when the partner betrays the linked agreement in
environmental taxes. Therefore, the incentive constraint becomes:
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This condition rules out a profitable one shot deviation from the agreed
cooperative tax rate when the partner is authorized to retaliate in tariffs. The following
proposition reports the results regarding the alteration in environmental cooperation when
linked with a trade agreement under Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions Rule.
Proposition 4. Enforcement in environmental cooperation is shaped by two opposite
factors, with ambiguous net effect, when linked with trade agreement under GATT Article
XXVIII:
i.) Transition from Nash Reversion to Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (WEC)
increases most cooperative tax rate,
ii.) If

, so that taxes are strategic complements, then enabling cross-

retaliation through linkage reduces most cooperative tax rate
As opposed to the trade policy, a smaller most cooperative tax rate in
environmental policy implies a reduction in cooperation since globally efficient tax rates
are greater than unilaterally efficient ones. Therefore, the proposition shows that even if
overall enforcement of environmental issue increases when it is internalized by
international trading regime, this actually is the result of changing punishment strategies
based on GATT Article XXVII. Linkage itself reduces the enforcement when compared
to the separated regimes where both agreements employ limited punishment rules.
III.IV. CONCLUSIONS
The question of whether we should have a unified international regime for trade
and environment has been an intriguing one for policy makers and researchers. There has
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been significant focus on environmental impacts of international trade, trade implications
of environmental regulations and enforcement implications of policy linkages. In this
paper, I focus on institutional design of reconciling trade and environmental policies
under existing legal body. I show that even under circumstances where other research
find no harm of linking these two issues, i.e., no significant relation between trade and
environmental issues, a closer look on current rules that were tailored to promote further
trade liberalization will emphasize the importance of institutional design in linking these
issues. My results encourage implementation of a limited punishment rule in
environmental agreements a la Withdrawal of Equivalent Concessions rule of GATT
(Article XXVIII); on the other hand, I also provide an argument supporting the suspicion
of linking the environmental issue with trade.
An interesting question that would provide an appealing extension to my work
would be about the sequence of agreement formation. Allowing some interaction between
trade and environmental issues, one can expect dynamic non-stationarities in
enforcement. Is signing a trade agreement first a stepping stone to a more comprehensive
collaboration in a unified international regime, or is it actually a stumbling block where
further cooperation in domestic issues is prevented since governments have already
depleted the enforcement power in trade agreement? Answers for this question would
improve our understanding of the structure of international cooperation in trade and
environment policies.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR CHAPTER I
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting the market clearing prices in

and differentiating it with respect to

tariff of foreign country as a function of political economy parameter

I obtain the Nash

. Using this Nash tariff and

market clearing price, the Nash welfare on an import good becomes:

Whereas the cooperative welfare on an import good is defined as:

Welfares of foreign country on export goods with Nash tariff and cooperative tariff are:

The results from Lemma 1 follow immediately from differentiating

and

with respect to .

A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
I prove this by showing that the paths that make type-1 and type-2 indifferent between cooperating and
betraying in consecutive periods is necessarily downward sloping in a pooling equilibrium case. Suppose
the condition
assume
satisfy

holds for type-1 foreign government in a high state of nature. I
, to show this cannot be correct. I solve the cooperation level values that
with equality backward from period :
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,…
This pattern gives us the borderline path of incentive compatibility for cooperation level:

Now, find the condition that satisfies

, using

However, plugging in the values of expectation and solving for

we get

, we get:

.
, which

contradicts with my initial assumption.
The part for type-2 foreign government is identical with the type-1 case. However, the expected future gain
from betraying is included in the analysis. The path defines the sequence of cooperation levels that satisfy
is:

And the necessary condition for an increasing level of cooperation,

.

contradicts with my initial assumption

A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose

and

. Let the periods

be maximum cooperation phase. The

only non-stationary variable in this phase is the belief of the home government about the foreign
governments’ cooperation. Therefore, I can easily write a general rule for continuation values in this phase:

Note that this continuation value increases in q. Remembering
does not betray, I can show this as follows: For an arbitrary
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as long as the foreign government
, the first term on the right hand side of

increases in

obviously. In order to see that the second term also increases, I write down the explicit

form of it:

. Let ,

But, the recursive term in the brackets is the second component of

Then the second component of
use
Let periods

becomes

, which is smaller than . To see this I

. This completes the case for maximum cooperation phase.
be gradual cooperation phase. I define the continuation values in this phase with

reference to the first continuation value of the maximum cooperation phase,

. Solving for

continuation values backwards starting from period , we get a general rule for continuation values in
gradual cooperation phase with reference to

Comparing the explicit forms, one can easily show that

and

are infinite sequences with

the former having greater value in each period due to higher beliefs and cooperation levels. Therefore,
discounted sum of a sequence of values that is greater in each period compared to another sequence is also
greater than the discounted some of the latter.

APPENDIX B: PROOFS FOR CHAPTER II
B.1. Proof of Lemma 2
The first order condition for optimal deviation tariff under no-linkage regime is given by:

97

The term in brackets is smaller than zero by assumption

; therefore,

. The

deviation tariff under the Nash reversion, however, maximizes stage game payoff since the punishment is
not related with magnitude of the deviation. Then,
for all

, by definition. Therefore,

.

To see that optimal deviation tariff is decreasing in cooperative tariff, differentiate the f.o.c. with
respect to cooperative tariff to get:

where the denominator is the second order condition and is negative. The effect of discount factor on
deviation tariff can be shown in the same way.

B.2. Proof of Proposition 4
I solve optimal deviation tariffs for identical cooperative tariff rates under no-linkage and linkage regimes.
The former one has the following first order condition:

whereas the first order condition under linkage is the following:

,

Suppose

then

for

a

small

change,

and

by assumption ( ). However, since both brackets are less than zero by
assumption ( ), this implies that

. Therefore,

by concavity

assumption ( ).
Part (b) follows from the fact that deviation tariffs are decreasing in the cooperative tariff, and the
deviation tariff under linkage regime is always greater than the deviation tariff under no-linkage regime.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 4
For each player there are two ways to deviate from the punishment path. The initial deviator might deviate
again in the same issue, or might not participate in its punishment by deviating in the other issue. Similarly
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the punisher might apply greater punishment in cross-retaliation, or might not cooperate in the original
deviation issue. Proofs are similar; therefore we will provide the proof only for the former one.
Claim 1: The initial deviator does not deviate again in the same issue.
Proof: Consider the initial optimal deviation tariff under linkage regime:

where,

Now, suppose there exists a

, since then it is not maximizing the initial stream of

But this contradicts with the definition of

payoffs. Therefore, there is no profitable deviation within the same policy after the initial deviation.
Claim 2: The deviator does not deviate from its punishment.
Suppose there exists a

where the following inequality holds:

Now, I show that the discount rates that support cooperation in the beginning (before the initial deviation)
also support cooperation in punishment. Let
additional

gain

from

deviation

in

denote the
the

other

issue

during

the

punishment

phase

and

denote the additional cost of doing so. Also remember
the gain from and cost of deviation in the initial case,

and

respectively. Then,

and

due to

strategic substitutability. To see this, write down the second condition as:

Issues are not inter-related; therefore we can write this condition in two parts:

Which are correct by the definition of submodularity and by
foreign policy arguments are strategic substitutes.

99

and

when own policy and

APPENDIX C: PROOFS FOR CHAPTER III
C.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating the first order condition for government's problem with respect to foreign tariff and
simplifying provides us the following condition:

Suppose the demand function for good
increases in

where

for

is given in the following form,

. Therefore,

,

and the above inequality is satisfied.

C.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose deviation tariffs are identical in separated and unified regimes, i.e.

. Then the first

components on the left hand side of the first order conditions are identical. Now, I check the brackets. For a
small change in deviation tariff,

, since tariffs are strategic substitutes. The order

of the second components inside the brackets is ambiguous since they are generated by different functions.
Nevertheless, when Home's welfare is relatively insensitive to a hike in foreign tax compared to a hike in
. This implies that

foreign tariff; then

; therefore

by concavity of welfare in tariffs. By Proposition 2 and Onder (2009), this shows that the self
enforcing tariff level is greater under linkage.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose home and foreign pollution taxes are strategic complements,

. In order to prove part i we

compare first order conditions under Nash reversion and limited punishment rules. The former one implies
that the optimal deviation tax is equal to the myopic best response tax:

whereas the optimal deviation tax under limited punishment reflect the considerations for future
punishment:

I find that deviation tax is greater under limited punishment as compared to the Nash reversion case for a
given cooperative tax rate,

. To see this, remember

100

in the Nash reversion,

whereas

under limited punishment. The

bracket is positive; therefore the first term inside the braces is negative. This shows that

. As

elaborated in Onder (2009), a higher deviation tax for a given cooperative tax rate implies a greater most
cooperative tax rate. The second part of the proof follows from comparison of unlinked and linked first
order conditions under limited punishment rule a la Proposition 3.
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